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REINVENTING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ADAM N. STEINMAN *
Abstract: Appellate jurisdiction in the federal system has been properly
criticized for both its doctrinal incoherence and its procedural complex-
ity. Although these critiques are well-founded, this Article reveals that, as
applied in practice, federal courts have drawn sensible lines between in-
terlocutory orders that are immediately appealable and those that are
not. A limited category of interlocutory orders, primarily those rejecting
immunities from suit, are immediately appealable as of right. All other in-
terlocutory orders are potentially eligible for discretionary appellate re-
view. The doctrinal morass of the present framework, however, has ob-
scured this basically sensible structure and has led to inefficient proce-
dures for seeking appellate review of interlocutory orders. This Article
proposes two new theories of appellate jurisdiction that preserve the cur-
rent regime's pragmatic structure without its procedural problems. First,
this Article argues that the All Writs Act authorizes discretionary appeals
(not just writs of mandamus), and that such appeals are a superior vehicle
for discretionary review of interlocutory orders. Second, this Article ar-
gues that for the limited category of interlocutory orders over which ap-
pellate jurisdiction is mandatory, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) provides a more co-
herent doctrinal foundation than the collateral order doctrine's awkward
interpretation of the term "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
INTRODUCTION
Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory trial court rulings is
among the most troublesome issues in civil procedure. In a given case,
a trial court may make dozens—if not hundreds'—of decisions before
it enters a final judgment on the merits. The question that invariably
arises is, may a litigant appeal a particular ruling immediately, or must
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School., B.A., Yale College. I would like to thank Jenny Carroll, Steve Goldblatt, and Mi-
chael Solimine for their helpful comments and suggestions. In addition, this Article has
benefited greatly from comments received during a faculty workshop at the Saint Louis
University School of Law. Thanks also to Drew Brinkman, Pamela Leist, and Lauren Wim-
mers, who provided excellent research assistance. The research for this Article was sup-
ported by a grant from the Harold C. Schott Foundation.
I See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that "the
district court has issued hundreds of pretrial orders").
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she wait until all trial court proceedings have concluded? The answer to
this question is a function of the appellate court's jurisdiction. In the
federal system, the jurisdictional starting point is the so-called final
judgment rule, which ordinarily postpones any appellate review until
the district court reaches a final judgment. 2 But this rule is more hon-
ored in the breach than in the observances The true scope of appellate
jurisdiction is found in the exceptions to the final judgment rule. 4
The prevailing doctrinal landscape is principally a product of two
mid-twentieth-century judicial innovations: (1) the collateral order doc-
trine, which expands the meaning of the term "final decision" for pur-
poses of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and (2) appellate mandamus, which allows
the federal courts of appeals to review interlocutory orders by issuing
writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act. 3 The current system has
been subject to much criticism: "hopelessly complicated,"6 "legal gym-
nastics,"7 "dazzling in its complexity,"8 "unconscionable intricacy" with
"overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next,"9 "an unaccept-
able morass,"10 "dizzying,"" "tortured,"12 "a jurisprudence of unbeliev-
able impenetrability," 18 "helter-skelter,"" "a crazy quilt," 15 "a near-chaotic
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (providing the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over
"appeals from all final decisions of the district courts").
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1, sc.
4 ("[Ii t is a custom Em)ore honour'd in the breach than the observance.").
4 For an early discussion of the exceptions to the final judgment rule, see generally
Theodore D. Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 Tex. L. REV. 292 (1966).
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) (All Writs Act); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949) (collateral order doctrine).
6 Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate
Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 555 (2002).
7 Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrung Solution, 54 U. Pm'. L. Rev. 717, 738 (1993).
Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (1984).
9 Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 165, 165-66 (1984).
1° Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality Appealability Problem, 47 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984).
" Waters, supra note 6, at 556.
12 Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L.
REV. 631, 662.
15 Waters, supra note 6, at 555 & n.110 (quoting Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils, and
Snares: Appeals Before Final Judgment 15 LITIGATION 18, 18, 19 (1989)).
14 Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 174.
15 Id. at 172; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND RE-
FORM 345 (1996); John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurispru-
dence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 200 (1994).
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state of affairs,"" a "Serbonian •Bog, 97 and "sorely in need of , limiting
principles."18
In the face of such criticism, the prevailing doctrine on appellate
jurisdiction has proven to be surprisingly immune from reform. In
the early 1990s, Congress took the unprecedented step of giving the
federal judiciary the authority to promulgate rules defining the scope
of its own appellate jurisdiction." This rulemaking authority has re-
mained largely dormant, however." Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court
has failed to use its case law to rectify its doctrinal creations, although
this failure is not for lack of opportunity. Since the 1980s, the Su-
preme Court has issued more than forty decisions implicating the
current doctrines for determining the jurisdiction of federal appellate
courts. 21 This level of attention is considerably greater than that given
to ostensibly higher profile civil procedure issues such as class ac-
tions,22 personal jurisdiction," pleading 24 and summary judgment25
standards, and the Erie doctrine.26
There is reason for optimism, however. The Supreme Court has in
the not-too-distant past shown a willingness to reconsider well-
established but doctrinally-cumbersome principles of appellate jurisdic-
tion. In its 1988 decision in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
"'Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 174.
17 Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New -Serbonian Bog" and Four Pro-
. posals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. Ito,. 539, 539 (1998).
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2000); see also infra notes 70-72
and accompanying text.
20 The Supreme Court has used this authority only once. In 1998, it promulgated Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(0, which gave federal appellate courts discretionary review
over district court orders granting or denying class action certification. FED. R. Cry. P.
23 (O.
2t See infra app. tb1.1.
n See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 838-41, 864 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1997).
23 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Ca., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Ca., 480 U.S. 102, 113-15 (1987).
24 See, e.g., Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct 1955, 1964-69 (2007); Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA, 534
U.S. 506, 510-13 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coor-
dination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993).
25 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986).
" See, e.g., Semtek Intl Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 500-01, 504
(2001); Gasperini v Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1996); Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1987).
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Corp., the Court overturned a doctrine known as the Enelow-Ettelson
rule,27
 which since the early 1900s had governed appellate jurisdiction
over orders staying (or refusing to stay) judicial proceedings. 28 The
Court unanimously recognized the need for a more fundamental con-
sideration of the precedents in this area and concluded that "the
Enelow-Ettelson rule is deficient in utility and sense."29 "A half century's
experience" with the rule persuaded the Court to overturn a doctrinal
framework that was "unsound," "unworkable," and "unnecessary to
achieve any legitimate goals."'"
Like the Enelow-Ettelson rule, the collateral order doctrine and ap-
pellate mandamus are creatures of the Court's own making, not man-
dates from Congress that the judiciary is obligated to respect. If the
Court can invent them, the Court can reinvent them. And if Gulf-
stream's treatment of the Enelow-Ettelson rule suggests a half-century limit
on the Court's patience with cumbersome doctrines of appellate juris-
diction, then the time is ripe to reconsider the collateral order doc-
trine31 and appellate mandamus.32
The solution, however, cannot be simply to discard these mid-
twentieth-century inventions and return to strict adherence to the
final judgment rule. It is no accident that the collateral order doc-
trine and appellate mandamus flourished during the last half of the
twentieth century. Countless commentators have noted the funda-
mental changes in civil litigation that occurred during this period. 33
In particular, there has been a steep decrease in trials resulting in ap-
pealable final judgments. Relatedly, there has been an increase in the
27 485 U.S. at 287.
28 Id. at 279-80 (describing Endow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935) and Ettel-
son v. Metro. Life Ins. Co„ 317 U.S. 188 (1942)).
" Id. at 282.
3° Id. at 283.
31 See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's initial
endorsement of the collateral order doctrine in 1949, in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
32 See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's ini-
tial endorsement of appellate mandamus in 1957, in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249 (1957)).
" See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1265-66 (2005) [hereinafter Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline]; Marc Galanter,
The litnishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 482-84 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, The Vanishing Trial];
Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. Rev. 1329, 1332-35 (2005); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. Rxv. 374, 378-80 (1982); Yeazell, supra note 12, at 632-39; see also Adam Liptak, Cases
Keep Flowing In, but the Jury Pool Is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14.
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importance of pretrial judicial management—including interlocutory
decisions relating to jurisdiction, alternative dispute resolution, plead-
ings, class actions, discovery, and summary judgment—through which
the parties posture themselves for a hard-fought but unappealable
settlement.34 Under this new model of adjudication, strict adherence
to the final judgment rule might not allow for meaningful appellate
review of the trial court decisions that really matter. 35 Indeed, many of
the most vocal critics of the current framework for appellate jurisdic-
tion argue that, as a policy matter, it is important that appellate review
of interlocutory orders remain available. 36 The real challenge, there-
fore, is to reinvent appellate jurisdiction in a way that recognizes the
new reality of civil adjudication without the host of conceptual, doc-
trinal, and procedural problems that accompany the current jurisdic-
tional framework.
An excellent starting point for this reinvention is to examine what
appellate courts have actually done while operating within the current
regime. Setting aside the doctrinal vehicles of interlocutory appellate
34 See Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline, supra note 33, at 1265-66; Galanter, The Vanishing
Thal, supra note 33, at 482-84; Redish, supra note 33, at 1332-35; Resnik, supra note 33, at
378-80; Yeazell, supra note 12, at 632-39; see also Liptak, supra note 33.
15 See, e.g„ Carrington, supra note 9, at 165-67; Cooper, supra note 8, at 160; Riyaz A.
Kanji, The Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 YALE
U. 511,513 (1990); Waters, supra note 6, at 551-59; Yeazell, supra note 12, at 646-64. This
problem is distinct from the more general concern about the costs of delaying appellate
review of interlocutory orders in cases that ultimately will yield a final, appealable judg-
ment. Edward Cooper provides excellent description of this more general concern:
If review of a trial court ruling is post poned until the final judgment, serious
consequences may ensue. As to matters that bear only on the conduct of the
litigation, an error may so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal
and further proceedings. The further proceedings may not only represent an
expensive duplication of effort, but may themselves be distorted beyond re-
pair by the events of the first trial. As to matters that have effects beyond the
court proceedings, irreparable injury may occur.
Cooper, supra note 8, at 157-58. For an excellent description of the value of appellate re-
view as a general matter, see Paul D. Carrington, Crowded DoCkets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. Rev. 542, 550-54
(1969). But cf. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
Rev. 751; 778-82 (1957).
56 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 9, at 167-68; Cooper, supra note 8, at 157; Howard B.
Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to
Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PnAc. & Pitoctss 285,286-87 (1999); Martineau, supra note 7, at
767-87; Nagel, supra note 15, at 202-04; Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Ap-
pealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Cornet. L. REv. 89,126 (1975); Waters, supra note 6, at
530-31. But see Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocu-
tory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 175,179-80 (2001) (arguing against expanded appel-
late jurisdiction over interlocutory ordeis).
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review and focusing on what appellate courts actually do, the jurisdic-
tional landscape looks far more rational. There is a limited category of
identifiable orders over which appellate courts have immediate, man-
datory jurisdiction.37 These are primarily interlocutory orders rejecting
claims of governmental and other immunities from suit. 38 Litigants may
appeal such orders as a matter of right, and appellate courts lack dis-
cretion to decline review." All other interlocutory rulings are poten-
tially eligible for discretionary appellate review, and appellate courts
have identified a number of factors relevant to when this discretionary
authority should be exercised. Although appellate courts exercise this
discretion quite sparingly (and justifiably so), it is fair to say that under
the prevailing judicial doctrines, no interlocutory trial court order is
categorically beyond an appellate court's jurisdiction. 40
This may sound controversial. Federal appellate courts repeatedly
invoke the prevailing doctrinal strictures to claim that their hands are
tied by the narrow scope of their appellate jurisdiction. 41 The facts on
the ground belie this conventional wisdom, however. Using either the
collateral order doctrine or appellate mandamus, federal appellate
courts have exercised review over every kind of interlocutory order
imaginable. 42 But because of the cumbersome doctrinal framework
created by the collateral order doctrine and appellate mandamus,
courts and commentators have yet to see the jurisdictional metastruc-
ture that has developed.
This underlying structure—mandatory appellate jurisdiction over
certain identifiable categories of interlocutory orders and discretionary
appellate jurisdiction for all others—should be moved to the forefront
of the jurisdictional regime. This Article proposes two doctrinal re-
forms that would reinvent our half-century-old framework for appellate
jurisdiction. First, courts and commentators have overlooked the possi-
bility that the All Writs Act authorizes discretionary appeals, not just
37 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
38 See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881, 892-93 (2007); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-30; Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982).
Sce 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); Mitcht/4 472 U.S. at 530.
40 See infra notes 242-277 and accompanying text. My point here does not apply to or-
ders for which appellate review is explicitly barred by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(2000) (forbidding review "by appeal or otherwise" of an order "remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed"). (discussed infra note 270).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Victoria-21, 3 F.Sd 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to re-
view a non-I-mai order qi]n the face of Congress' unquestionable intent to limit appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders").
42 See infra notes 248-269 and accompanying text.
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writs of. mandamus.* This approach has support from legislation en-
acted by Congress shortly before the Supreme Court began its inven-
tion of the current regime in the late 1940s and 1950s, and this Article
is the first to recognize its relevance to the appellate jurisdiction de-
bate." All Writs Act appeals would be a superior method for engaging
in discretionary appellate review of interlocutory orders than the cur-
rent regime's awkward use of appellate mandamus and the collateral
order doctrine.
Second, courts should recognize that for the limited category of
interlocutory orders over which appellate jurisdiction is mandatory,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)'s provision of appellate jurisdiction over orders
relating to injunctions* provides a more coherent doctrinal founda-
tion than the collateral order doctrine's interpretation of "final deci-
sion" under § 1291. 46 These orders—typically orders rejecting gov-
ernmental immunities from suit—are not in any sense more "final"
than other interlocutory orders. 47 Rather, the immunities addressed
in such orders are deemed to have an injunctive quality as a matter of
substantive law; the holder of the immunity is entitled not just to win
the case against it, but to enjoin the case from proceeding.* Situating
such appeals under § 1292(a) would bring the jurisdictional theory
into alignment with the policy judgments that actually determine
whether immediate appellate review is available. Currently, these pol-
icy decisions are obscured by the cumbersome-yet-unhelpful frame-
work of the collateral order doctrine.
Part I of this Article summarizes the statutory structure of appel-
late jurisdiction. 49 Part II describes and criticizes what are currently
the two most important judicial inventions in the area of appellate
jurisdiction—the collateral order doctrine and appellate mandamus. 5°
Part III explains how the collateral order doctrine and appellate
mandamus operate in practice and argues that appellate courts have
implemented a fairly rational regime despite the troubling doctrinal
45 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
" See infra notes 290-293 and accompanying text (discussing Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 23, 62 Stat. 869, 990).
45 28	 § 1292(a) (1) (2000) (authorizing appeals from "[Onterlocutory orders ...
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions").
46 See infra notes 343-373 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 111-137 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 353-357 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
50
 See infra notes 76-241 and accompanying text.
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landscape.51 Part IV proposes a reinvention of appellate jurisdiction
that will provide a better foundation for interlocutory appellate re-
view; it also responds to potential critiques of this reinvention. 52
I. THE STATUTORY FOUNDATION OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This Part summarizes the key statutes that govern the jurisdiction
of the federal courts of appeals." The core provision is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which gives federal appellate courts jurisdiction over "appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts."54 This statute is the
source of what is known as the final judgment rule. In 1945, in Gatlin
v. United States, the Supreme Court defined § 1291 quite narrowly: "A
'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the mer-
its and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment."55 Once such a "final decision" is reached, the appellate court
has jurisdiction to review all previous district court orders that led to
that final decision.56
The most longstanding statutory exception to the final judgment
rule is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), which authorizes immediate appellate re-
view of particular enumerated orders, most notably orders granting,
modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions. 57 Section 1292(a) also
provides exceptions for interlocutory orders involving the appointment
of receivers and the winding up of receiverships, 58 as well as for inter-
locutory orders determining the rights and liabilities of parties to ad-
miralty cases."
During the last half century, the statutory exceptions to the final
judgment rule have expanded somewhat. In 1958, Congress enacted 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), which created a certification procedure for enabling
51 See infra notes 242-277 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 278-389 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
54 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
H 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
56 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 710 (1996) (*The general
rule is that 'a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has
been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be
ventilated.'" (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866
(1994))); see also Joan Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdic-
tion Before and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1339 (1998) (citing 15A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3905.1 (2d. ed. 1992
& Supp. 1996)).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1).
" Id. § 1292(a) (2).
59 Id. § 1292 (a) (3).
-
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appellate review over some interlocutory orders. 6° Under § 1292(b), a
district court may certify that a particular order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 61 If the district
court so certifies, the appellate court may "in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within
ten days after the entry of the order."62 The district court has complete
discretion over whether to certify such an order for an interlocutory
appeal," and the appellate court has complete discretion over whether
to allow an appeal from the certified order. 64 Section 1292(b) has not
been an effective method for obtaining appellate review over interlocu-
tory orders for two reasons. First, the certification requirement gives
district courts a veto over § 1292(b) appeals." Second, the federal ap-
pellate courts have narrowly construed § 1292(b)'s requirements so
that relatively few certified appeals are accepted."
Congress has periodically created additional exceptions to the
Final judgment rule for particular kinds of orders in particular kinds
of cases. Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act, for example, allows
interlocutory appeals of certain orders relating to arbitration. 67 More
recently, Congress has allowed discretionary appellate review of juris-
dictional rulings in cases subject to the new forms of federal subject
Id. § 1292(b).
61 Id.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 3929.
" See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978) ('The appellate court
may deny the appeal for any reason, including docket congestion."); see also Martineau,
supra note 7, at 733.
65 See Redish, supra note 36, at 108-09 ("By providing trial courts with a veto over ap-
peals, the certificate requirement has vastly reduced section 1292(b)'s potential effective-
ness as a safety valve from the rigors of the final judgment rule.").
66 Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO,
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1990) (noting that "some federal courts have purported to limit
the use of section 1292(b) to 'big cases,' and in fact, relatively few appeals are ... accepted
by the circuit courts"); see Redish, supra note 36, at 109 (arguing that "[t] he circuit courts
have generally not been receptive to [§ 1292(6)] applications").
67 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). In the criminal context, Congress has authorized immediate
appeals of orders relating to detention and release in criminal cases. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(c) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2000 & Supp. 1V 2004).
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matter jurisdiction created by the Class Action Fairness Act° 8 and the
Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act. 69
Also worth mentioning are two statutes that authorize judicial
rulemaking about appellate jurisdiction through the procedures set
forth in the Rules Enabling Act." A 1990 statute, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(c), allows rules that would "define when a ruling of a district
court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this ti-
tle:17i A 1992 statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), authorizes rules
designating additional categories of interlocutory orders from which an
immediate appeal may be had. 72 This rulemaking authority has re-
mained largely dormant, however. The lone example of its exercise is
the 1998 adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(0," which
gives the appellate courts discretion to hear immediate appeals from
orders granting or denying motions to certify a class action. 74
Although they have evolved and expanded in recent decades, the
statutory- and rule-based exceptions to the final judgment rule are not
68 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c) (1) (West 2006); see Adam N. Steinman; "Less" Is "Morel Tex-
tualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline
Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2007).
eg 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (3) (2000 & Supp. 1II 2003); see Thomas J. McLaughlin & Adam
N. Steinman, The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act's Impact on Major Accident Litiga
tion, 34 BRIEF 16, 16 (2004).
7° 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2000) (subsection (c) enacted in 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)
(2000) (subsection (e) enacted in 1992). For an excellent discussion of the legislative his-
tory behind the 1990 and 1992 acts giving the Supreme Court rulemaking authority in this
area, see Martineau, supra note 7, at 720-26.
70 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c).
72 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).
73 FED. R. Cm. P. 23(f). Rule 23(f) provides: "A court of appeals may in its discretion
permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certifi-
cation under this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order."
Id. No special certification needs to be sought from the district court, but the party seeking
to appeal must obtain the appellate court's permission. The appellate court has "unfet-
tered discretion" whether to hear an immediate appeal. In as Delta Air Lines, Inc., 310 F.3d
953, 957 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting FED. R. Cm,. P. 23(f) advisory committee notes (1998)).
For an analysis of how federal appellate courts should exercise their discretion under Rule
23(f), see generally Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule
2311), 41 Wm. & MARY L Rrv. 1531 (2000).
74 FED. R. Cm. P. 23(0. Rule 54(b) is another Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that
might be characterized as an exception to the final judgment rule. See FED. R. Cry. P.
54(b). Rule 54(b) allows the district court to enter a final judgment as to certain claims
and parties in a particular action, even if trial court proceedings are ongoing with respect
to other claims or parties. Id. If the district court does so, an immediate appeal may be
taken as to those claims or parties for which a Rule 54(b) final judgment has been entered.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218, 1220 .(5th Cir.
1990).
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the final word on appellate jurisdiction. Today, the most significant as-
pect of appellate jurisdiction for courts and litigants are the judicially
created bases for appellate jurisdiction, which are described in the next
Par t. 75
II. THE JUDICIAL INVENTIONS THAT DEFINE THE CURRENT
APPROACH TO APPELLATE JURISDICTION
During the last half century, the U.S. Supreme Court has crafted
a number of jurisdictional doctrines that expand appellate jurisdic-
tion beyond the final judgment rule and its explicit statutory excep-
tions. The Court ostensibly gleans these doctrines from statutory au-
thority, but they are more properly viewed as judicial inventions be-
cause a considerable amount of interpretive imagination is needed to
deduce these doctrines from their purported statutory foundation.
This Part describes and critiques the two most commonly used judi-
cially crafted doctrines: the collateral order doctrine and appellate
mandamus. 76
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine: Precedent and Procedure
One judicial invention that has expanded the scope of federal ap-
pellate jurisdiction is the collateral order doctrine. This Section sum-
marizes the collateral order doctrine's invention in 1949 and its evolu-
tion over the last several decades. 77 It also summarizes the procedures
by which litigants invoke the collateral order doctrine and through
75 See infra notes 76-241 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 77-241 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has at
times suggested other judicially invented methods of appellate jurisdiction, these have
failed to take root, For example, in Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., the Supreme Court suggested
that an interlocutory order could be deemed a "final decision" for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 if the court of appeals determined that immediate review was justified after balanc-
ing "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other." 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964). The current viability
of Gillespie's balancing approach has been repeatedly questioned, however. See, e.g., Coo-
pen & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978) ("If Gillespie were extended beyond the
unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of all significance."); Fultz v. Alternative
Retail Concepts, Inc., 2 F. App'x 409, 412 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2001) (unpublished decision)
(I'll he continued validity of Gillespie has been called into question by the Supreme
Court."); Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Group, 74 F.3d 990, 996 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Illt is
unclear whether the Gillespie doctrine is still viable."); see also Redish, supra note 36, at 98
(noting in 1975 that Gillespie's "balancing approach has not yet received widespread recog-
nition"). It has been over thirty years since the U.S. Supreme Court cited Gillespie's view of
§ 1291 with approval. Cf. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 478 n.7 (1975).
77 See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
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which courts determine whether the doctrine allows immediate review
of interlocutory orders. 78
1. The Invention and Evolution of the Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine derives from the Supreme Court's
1949 decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Carp.79 The collateral
order doctrine allows immediate appellate review if three criteria are
satisfied. First, the order must resolve an important issue that is com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action.8° Second, the order must
be effectively unreviewable if the aggrieved party is forced to wait until
the trial court proceedings are complete. 81 Third, the order must be
final in the sense that it conclusively determines the particular issue. 82
Although the Court often enumerates these three factors, 83 the first
factor in actuality comprises two requirements—the issue resolved by
the order must be both "important" and "separate from the merits."84
Accordingly, it is not uncommon to see the collateral order doctrine
described in terms of four factors rather than three. 85 Interlocutory
orders that satisfy the collateral order doctrine's requirements are con-
sidered "final decisions" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, there-
fore, are immediately within a court of appeals' jurisdiction. 86
"8 See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
79 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
80 E.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. May-
acarnas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).
81 E.g., Will, 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfstrearra Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
82 E.g., wig 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
8' See, e.g., Will, 546 U.S. at 349 ("The requirements for collateral order appeal have
been distilled down to three conditions."); Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276 ("We have
articulated a three-pronged test to determine whether an order that does not finally re-
solve a litigation is nonetheless appealable under § 1291.").
84 E.g., Will, 546 U.S. at 849; Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
8' See Espinal-Dominguez v. Puerto Rico, 352 F.3d 490, 496 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing
the collateral order doctrine's four elements of "separability, finality, urgency, and impor-
tance"); Persyn v. United States, 935 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The collateral order doc-
trine has four requirements."); 5A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 1337.4 (1992) (describ-
ing Cohen as "setting forth four conditions that must be met for interlocutory appeals un-
der collateral order doctrine"); Nagel, supra note 15, at 206 (quoting a restatement of the
Cohen factors by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468).
a8 Until fairly recently, the Supreme Court had given conflicting indications about
whether the collateral order doctrine "is simply an interpretation of section 1291, or is a
judicially created exception to that statute." Solimine, supra note 66, at 1184 & n.99 (citing
Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration offustice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. 424, 430 (1987-88) (statement of Professor Judith Resnik) and Redish, supra
note 36, at 124-26). The Court has since clarified that the collateral order doctrine "is best
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In the seminal Cohen case, the district court concluded that un-
der the Erie doctrine, a federal court was not bound by a state law re-
quiring plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits to post a substantial
bond before being able to proceed. 87 Thus, the plaintiff in Cohen was
allowed to proceed with his action without posting the bond that
would have been required under the state law. 88 The Supreme Court
ruled that immediate, review of that ruling was available:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied re-
view and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is ad-
judicated."
No decision prior to Cohen had ever identified this "small class" of
immediately appealable orders."
understood not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule laid _down by Congress in
§ 1291, but as a `practical construction' of it." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916-17 (1997) (holding
that Cohen was the source for an expanded 'definition" of the term "final decision").
87 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 544-45 & n.I.
88 Id. at 545.
89 Id. at 546.
88 See id. In this same paragraph of the Cohen opinion, the Court cites three of its prior
cases for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 should be given a "practical rather than a
technical construction." Id. (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940);
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926); Bank of Colum-
bia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 567, 569, (1828)). Cohen's reliance on these cases is rather
puzzling. Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, decided in 1828, decades before the federal courts of
appeals even existed, concerned a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court.
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 567. If anything, Bank of Columbia undermines Cohen's exception to the
final judgment rule—it refused to issue a writ of, mandamus on the ground that to grant
the writ "would be a plain evasion of the provision of the Act of Congress, that firm/judg-
ments only should be brought before this Court for re-examination." Id. at 569. The 1926
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co. decision also did not concern the appellate ju-
risdiction of the federal courts of appeals, as the district court had clearly reached a final
judgment on all of the claims before it. 269 U.S. at 413 (noting that "a jury trial ... re-
sult[ed] in seventy-three awards of compensation to the property owners" and that
"[j]udgments were entered confirming all these awards"). The court of appeals affirmed
all but one of the claims, and the only question was whether the Supreme Court could
review the affirmed claims given that the court of appeals had ordered a new trial with
respect to the one nonaffirmed claim. Id. Lastly, the 1940 decision in Cobbledick v. United
States, far from supporting Cohen's exception to the final judgment rule, made clear that
"the requirement of finality will be enforced not only against a party to the litigation but
against a witness who is a stranger to the main proceeding." 309 U.S. at 326.
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Since Cohen, the Supreme Court has invoked the collateral order
doctrine to permit review of interlocutory orders denying claims by
governmental defendants for immunity from suit. 91 Examples of such
claims include a president's claim of absolute irnmunity,92 a govern-
ment official's claim of qualified immunity," a state's claim of immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment," and a federal employee's claim of
immunity under the Westfall Act. 95 According to the Court, such orders
are "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from a final judgment because
the immunity creates not merely a defense to liability, but rather a right
not to stand trial that includes a right to be free from trial-related bur-
dens."
In many other cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the use of
the collateral order doctrine. Defendants, for example, have sought to
extend the Court's treatment of interlocutory immunity rulings to
other issues that might entitle a defendant to an early dismissal of a
lawsuit. The Court, however, has held that the collateral order doc-
trine does not allow immediate appeals of orders refusing to dismiss a
9 ' See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of the Su-
preme Court's past treatment of the collateral order doctrine in particular cases, see
Solimine, supra note 66, at 1170-71.
92 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982).
93 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985).
9' P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Audi. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993).
9
'3 Osborn v. Haley; 127 S. Ct. 881, 892-93 (2007). Although the Supreme Court has yet
to address the issue, the federal courts of appeals have unanimously held that the collat-
eral order doctrine also allows immediate appeal of an order denying a foreign entity's
claim of immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See, e.g., Rux
Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 467 (4th Cir. 2006); FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Re-
publique du Congo, 455 F.3d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 2006); Transatl. Shiffahrtskontor GmbH v.
Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 2000).
96 See, e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 ("The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability; ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial."). The Supreme Court has applied a similar logic to immunities from criminal
prosecution. It has allowed immediate appeals under the collateral order doctrine from
orders denying a criminal defendant's claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prose-
cution and a legislator's claim that the Speech and Debate Clause bars prosecution. See
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1984) (Double Jeopardy Clause);
Helstoski v Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979) (Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-61 (1977) (Double jeopardy Clause). Also in the criminal
context, the Supreme Court recently held that an order allowing the government to ad-
minister antipsychotic medication forcibly to a criminal defendant solely to render him
competent to stand trial was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 176-77 (2003). Such an interlocutory order was deemed to be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because "[b]y the time of trial [the
defendant] will have undergone forced medication—the very harm that he seeks to avoid.
He cannot undo that harm even if he is acquitted." Id.
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case based on a prior judgment or settlement,97 forum non conven-
iens,98 or a contractual forum selection clause." According to the
Court, such orders may be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final
judgment because even after a trial on the merits, the appellate court
can reverse the earlier denial and order the case dismissed.'" In other
words, such defenses merely entitle a defendant to have the case dis-
missed (eventually), not to avoid all of the burdens of trial. The Court
has also rejected attempts to use the collateral order doctrine to ap-
peal interlocutory rulings on class certification, 191 disqualification of
counsel,'" and sanctions for discovery violations.'"
An order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine is appealable as of right. Such an order is deemed to be a "fi-
nal decision" over which the court of appeals "shalt have jurisdiction"
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1 " Thus, unlike other sources of interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction, such as § 1292(b), neither the district court nor
the appellate court has discretion to prevent or decline review of inter-
locutory rulings that qualify under the collateral order doctrine. 105
97 Will, 546 U.S. at 349 (holding that the collateral order doctrine does not allow an
immediate appeal from an order rejecting defendants' assertion of the Federal Tort
Claims Act's judgment bar); Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 884 (holding that the collateral
order doctrine does not allow an immediate appeal from an order rejecting defendants'
assertion that the action was barred by a prior settlement).
98 Van Cauwenberghe v. Bard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988).
Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989).
100 See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 869 (noting that "rights under private set-
tlement agreements can be adequately vindicated on appeal from final judgment").
101 Coopers &' Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 464-65.
NI Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472. U.S. 424, 425-26 (1985); see also Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260 {1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, v, Risjord, 449 U,S,
368, 370 (1981).
I°3 Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 200 (1999).
104
	
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (emphasis added); see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 ("[Al district
court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of
law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstand-
ing the absence of a final judgment."); Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting that the "right to appeal" as a collateral order extends to immunity rulings);
cf. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,].) (reading
the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the collateral order doctrine to class certification
orders as meaning that "class certification orders. [are not] automatically appealable under -
28 U.S.C. § 1291").
105 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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2. Procedures for Invoking the Collateral Order Doctrine
Because the collateral order doctrine provides an appeal as of
right,'" a litigant invoking it must simply file a notice of appea1. 107 The
notice of appeal states only the parties who are appealing, the judg-
ment or order being appealed, and the court to which the appeal is
being taken. 1 °8 The notice of appeal does not even need to specify that
the collateral order doctrine is the basis for appellate jurisdiction.
Unless the party opposing the appeal files a preliminary motion to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 109 the appeal will proceed to
full briefing on the merits as well as on the appellate court's jurisdic-
tion, and the jurisdictional issue will not be resolv&I until full briefing is
complete. A notice of appeal must be filed within the time limits set by
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which, for civil appeals, is typi-
cally thirty days after the district court enters the order being ap-
pealed. 11 o
B. Problems with the Collateral Order Doctrine .
The collateral order doctrine suffers from three principal prob-
lems. First, it is inconsistent with the statutory text on which it is pur-
portedly based. Second, it fails to account for the policy concerns that
actually motivate its use in particular cases. Third, the process for in-
voking it and determining whether it applies in particular situations is
inefficient in a number of situations.
Although the collateral order doctrine purportedly defines a cate-
gory of decisions that are "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the
elements of the collateral order doctrine are inconsistent with this tex-
1°6 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
1°7 FED. R, APP. P. 3; see, e.g., Berrey v. Marco Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 641-42 & n.2 (10th
Cir. 2006); Ussery v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dept of Health & Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1998).
109 Id. 3(c)(1).
1 °9 See, e.g., D.C. Cm, R. 27(g) (allowing dispositive motions to be filed within forty-
five days of an appeal being docketed and deferring merits-briefing until motion is de-
cided).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992) ("An appeal
taken under the collateral order doctrine is subject to all the usual appellate rules and
time periods, including Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."). Under Ap-
pellate Rule 4, the deadline in civil cases is thirty days after entry of the judgment or order,
unless the United States is a party, in which case the deadline is sixty days. FED. R. APP, P.
4(a)(1). In criminal cases, the defendant has ten days to file a notice of appeal. Id.
4(b)(1). Where the government has a right to appeal in a criminal case, the deadline is
thirty days. Id.
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tual premise."' The collateral order doctrine allows immediate review
of interlocutory orders where (1) the issue decided by the order is im-
portant, (2) the issue decided by the order is separate from the merits,
(3) the order is effectively unreviewable if the aggrieved party is forced
to wait until the trial court proceedings are complete, and (4) the or-
der is final in the sense that it conclusively resolves the issue in ques-
tion . 112
Consider the collateral order doctrine's first factor: whether an
interlocutory ruling concerns an "important" issue. 113 This is a per-
fectly reasonable factor to take into account when deciding whether
to expend appellate resources on an interlocutory appeal and risk the
delay that such an appeal might entail. But it has absolutely nothing
to do with fmality. Both an important ruling and an unimportant rul-
ing can be equally "final."
The same may be said of the collateral order doctrine's require-
ment that the ruling must be "effectively unreviewable" absent an im-
mediate appeal.'" All other things being equal, there is less need to
review an interlocutory decision that could effectively be reviewed at
the end of the proceedings. But are such rulings really any less "final"
than ones that cannotbe effectively reviewed at the end of the proceed-
ings? One might argue that an effectively unreviewable decision is "fi-
nal" precisely because it cannot be corrected on appeal. By that logic,
however, a truly final decision (e.g., a trial court's judgment for one
side or the other) would not be considered "final" because it can be
corrected on appeal.
The collateral order doctrine's requirement that the issue decided
must be "separate from the merits" has some plausible connection to
finality." 5 One could argue, as the Supreme Court suggested in Cohen,
that an issue that is not separate from the merits is simply a "step to-
ward final disposition of the merits of the case."116 But all court rulings
are, in some sense, steps toward the court's final disposition, even ones
that have nothing to do with the merits of the case. The correctness of
the interlocutory order at issue in Cohen—the district court's refusal to
in See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
112 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
113 See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47; see also Wi14 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfsrream Aerospace, 485
U.S. at 276.
114 See Will, 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfibvam Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
115 See Will, 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfitream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
116 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
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impose the state law bond requirement 117—may not depend on the
merits of the parties' substantive claims or defenses. But it is surely an
important step toward the court's final disposition of the case.
In any event, the Supreme Court's treatment of the "separate
from the merits" requirement belies any reliance on this kind of ar-
gument. The orders that are most frequently appealed under the col-
lateral order doctrine are decisions rejecting a government official's
claim of qualified immunity. 118 Typically, an official is entitled to im-
munity from damages for constitutional violations if she can demon-
strate that her conduct was reasonable under the law as it existed at
the time she acted. 119 Although the Court has held that this question
is "conceptually distinct" from the question of whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred, 12° it is hard to see how the qualified immu-
nity inquiry—which will likely consider exactly the same legal sources
as the inquiry into whether a violation occurred—is truly "separate
from the merits." And it is nonsensical to say that such a ruling is not
a critical "step toward final disposition of the merits." 121 If the defen-
dant prevails on her immunity defense, the plaintiff's claim for dam-
ages fails an the merits.
The last element of the collateral order doctrine is that the order
must "conclusively resolve" the particular issue before the court. 122 To
be sure, a decision that conclusively resolves a given issue (such as the
applicability of a state law bond requirement) is more "final" than a
decision that is "tentative, informal or incomplete."123 But this standard
is easily met in connection with almost all interlocutory orders. 124 It is a
far cry from the strict definition of "final decision" embodied in the
final judgment rule. 125 The textual fallacy is that the collateral order
17 See id. at 544-45.
118 See, e.g Mitchel{ 472 U.S. at 530.
119 Elder v. Holloway; 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994) ("The doctrine of qualified immunity
shields public officials like respondents from damages actions unless their conduct was
unreasonable in light of clearly established law.").
120 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527.
121 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
122 See Will, 546 U.S. at 349; Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 276.
125 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (noting that § 1291 "disallow[s] appeal from any decision
which is tentative, informal or incomplete").
124 Set Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906) ("In a certain sense finality
can be asserted of the orders under review, so, in a certain sense, finality can be asserted of
any order of a court.").
125 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text; see also Redish, supra note 36, at 94
(noting that the collateral order doctrine's notion of "internal" finality did not satisfy the
concept of finality generally thought to be required by the fmal judgment rule). •
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doctrine's relaxed definition of finality applies only where the doc-
trine's other three elements are met. Thus, what makes so-called collat-
eral orders immediately appealable is not their conclusiveness. Rather,
it is the other three elements—separability, unreviewability, and impor-
tance—that are doing the legwork. And these are the three elements
that are the hardest to square with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Furthermore, the elements of the collateral order doctrine ob-
scure, rather than illuminate, the policy concerns that actually moti-
vate its use. Compare an order denying a police officer's qualified
immunity defense with an order denying a defendant's motion to
dismiss on the basis that a prior judgment or settlement bars the cur-
rent lawsuit. The first order is categorically appealable under the col-
lateral order doctrine, whereas the second is not. The justification for
this distinction is that qualified immunity constitutes a right "not to
stand trial." 126 This makes a denial of immunity effectively =review-
able on appeal from a final judgment because to get to such a final
judgment, the defendant must endure the trial-related burdens that
immunity is supposed to prohibit. 121 A res judicata defense based on a
prior settlement or judgment, on the other hand, is a mere defense to
liability, not a "right not to stand trial:128 Such a defense only entitles
the defendant to prevail on the merits at the end of the day, and that
result can be accomplished by allowing the defendant to appeal after
a final judgment. 129 If the trial court was incorrect, the appellate court
can reverse the final judgment and order the case dismissed.
Why, exactly, does our system tolerate delayed appellate enforce-
ment of a prior judgment or settlement, but not delayed appellate en-
forcement of qualified immunity? The purpose of allowing a res judi-
cata defense based on a prior judgment or settlement is to avoid reliti-
gation of claims that were or should have been raised in an earlier
action.13° If a defendant is forced to relitigate those issues despite the
earlier judgment or settlement, he has in a very real sense lost the
benefit of that judgment or settlement, just as the other hypothetical
defendant has lost the benefit of qualified immunity. The only plausible
126 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
iv See id. ("The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to li-
ability; ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial"):
[26 Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 873.
129 See, e.g., id. at 869 (noting that 'rights under private settlement agreements can be
adequately vindicated on appeal from final judgment").
120 See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4436 ("The purpose of res judicam is to
protect against the burden of relitigating the same issues.").
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basis for distinguishing the two is a value judgment about which right is
more deserving of immediate appellate correction. Reasonable people
may disagree about how to rank these two rulings, but it is complete
fiction to say that one is a "final decision" and the other is not. It is simi-
larly meaningless to ask in the abstract whether either ruling is "effec-
tively unreviewable" absent an immediate appeal. A ruling is "effectively
unreviewable" if and only if a policy judgment has been made that the
ruling requires vindication by immediate appeal."'
Another problem with the collateral order doctrine is the fact
that in many situations it operates as a discretionary basis for appel-
late jurisdiction. Appeals from orders granting or denying security in
civil actions provide a good example. Appellate courts have taken a
flexible approach to determining whether the collateral order doc-
trine allows an immediate appeal of such orders, balancing a number
of factors including the level of hardship imposed on the party who
needs to post the security, the risk of nonpayment that would result if
the security is denied, and whether the decision turns on a legal
rather than a factual issue.'" More generally, some appellate courts
have explicitly incorporated a discretionary cost-benefit analysis into
their collateral order doctrine analysis.'"
Such discretionary inquiries are not necessarily bad policy. But
such discretion is problematic in the context of the collateral order
doctrine for two reasons. First, jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides: "The courts of
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts."134 If appellate jurisdiction under the collateral or-
der doctrine has in practice become discretionary rather than rnanda-
'" See Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 864 ("{Whether a right is 'adequately vindica-
ble' or 'effectively reviewable,' simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the
value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment
requirement.").
L 52 See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 3914.2.
'33 See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir.
1978) (stating that the collateral order doctrine applies only when "on balance, the danger
of denying justice by delay outweighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review"),
reu'd in part by 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en bane); accord Socialist Workers Party v.
Grubisic, 604 F.2d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto,
452 F.3d 892, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (allowing the appeal of a discovery order under the
collateral order doctrine because the cost of releasing certain information subject to the
discovery order "outweighs the costs of piecemeal review that underlie the finality rule"
and because "the privacy and competitive interests ... that would potentially go unpro-
tected overcome the interest in finality").
I" 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (emphasis added).
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tory (at least for some kinds of interlocutory orders), then it is awk-
ward to base the collateral order doctrine on a statute using the word
"shall."
Second, the process for invoking the collateral order doctrine
(and determining whether it applies to a particular case) is ill-suited
to these kinds of discretionary judgments. This too is a consequence
of the collateral order doctrine's textual justification as a construction
- of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because § 1291 provides for an appeal as of right,
a party relying on the collateral order doctrine needs to file only a
notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 138 A
notice of appeal, however, is not required even to state the basis for
appellate jurisdiction. 138 And it is certainly not a procedural vehicle
for convincing the appellate court that it should exercise its discretion
to hear a particular interlocutory appeal. Ordinarily, collateral order
doctrine appeals proceed to full briefing, not only on the issue of ap-
pellate jurisdiction but also on the substantive merits of the appea1. 137
Thus, the applicability of the collateral order doctrine is usually not
resolved until full briefing is complete. If, however, the applicability of
the collateral order doctrine depends on the appellate court's discre-
tionary (and hence unpredictable) balancing of concerns, this proce-
dure creates a risk that substantial energy and expense will be in-
curred briefing, arguing, and considering the merits of an appeal that
will ultimately be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
C. Appellate Mandamus: Precedent and Procedure
Appellate mandamus is another mid-twentieth-century judicial in-
vention that has allowed federal courts of appeals to circumvent the
final judgment rule. The statutory source for appellate mandamus is
the All Writs Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 188 This seemingly in-
nocuous provision simply states that "all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their re-
136 See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
i" See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) (1).
137 See id. 28(a) (requiring the appellant to present in its brief a "jurisdictional state-
ment" as well as a "statement of the issues," 'statement of the case," "statement of facts,"
and "argument"); id. 28(b) (requiring the appellee to present the same in its brief, unless
it is satisfied with the appellant's statements); see also, e.g., Venus Lines Agency v. CVG In-,
dusula Venezolana De Aluminio, 210 F.3d 1309, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Having re-
viewed the parties' briefs, the court is satisfied that Venalum adequately identified the or-
den from which it appeals in its notice of appeal, and the appeal is properly brought un-
der the collateral order doctrine." (emphasis added)).
196 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
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spective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law."'" Although this language does not appear to expand appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders, the Supreme Court has con-
strued it to authorize appellate courts to review interlocutory orders by
way of a writ of mandamus.m This Section summarizes the invention of
appellate mandamus in the 1950s and its evolution over the last several
decades. 141 It also summarizes the procedures by which litigants invoke
appellate mandamus and through which courts determine whether
appellate mandamus is justified in a particular case. 142
1. The Invention and Evolution of Appellate Mandamus
Appellate mandamus is based on the appellate court's authority
under the All Writs Act to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions."143 To satisfy the All Writs Act's ju-
risdictional prerequisite, it is only necessary that the case may, at some
future time, come within the court's appellate jurisdiction.'" The tex-
tual justification for appellate mandamus is that the court may issue a
writ of mandamus "in aid or the jurisdiction that will exist in the fu-
ture once a hypothetical final judgment is entered. 145
As with the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court did not
endorse this method of appellate court review until the mid-twentieth
century. In the 1957 decision of La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., the Court
held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit properly
issued a writ of mandamus to prevent a district court judge from re-
ferring two antitrust cases to a special master for trial under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b). 10 The Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument that the power of the courts of appeals does not extend to the
issuance of writs of mandamus. 147 Instead, it reasoned that "[s]ince
139 Id. § 1651(a).
140 See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 3932.
141 See infra notes 143-198 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
143 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (emphasis added).
144 In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998).
143 See La Buy v Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957) ("Since the Court of Ap-
peals could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings entertain appeals in these cases, it
has power in proper circumstances, as here, to issue writs of mandamus reaching them.").
As explained at supra note 56 and accompanying text, when a "final decision" is reached
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review all orders
leading to that final decision.
146 352 U.S. at 250-51.
147 Id. at 254-55.
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the Court of Appeals could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings
entertain appeals in these cases, it has power in proper circumstances,
as here, to issue writs of mandamus reaching them." 18 The Court
noted both that the district court's orders concerned rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court and that there had been a clear abuse of
discretion under those rules. 149 It concluded that "supervisory control
of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper
judicial administration in the federal system" and that, therefore, the
All Writs Act conferred discretionary power on the courts of appeals
to issue writs of mandamus in exceptional circumstances, such as
those existing in that case.'"
Until La Buy, the authority of federal courts of appeals to direct
writs of mandamus to federal trial courts "in aid of" the appellate
court's jurisdiction was very narrow. 151 Mandamus was proper only
where future appellate jurisdiction "might otherwise be defeated by
the unauthorized action of the court below."152 For example, manda-
mus could issue if the federal trial court refused to adjudicate a case
at all, thus preventing a reviewable final decision from ever being
reached. 153 Similarly, mandamus could issue if a federal trial court
stayed proceedings so that a state court could adjudicate an action. In
that situation, res judicata or collateral estoppel could otherwise pre-
vent either the federal trial court or the federal appellate court from
addressing the merits. 154 But the Supreme Court had never endorsed
145 Id. at 255.
145 Id. at 257.
155 Id. at 259-60.
151 See Robert S. Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United State's' Courts of Appeals: A
Complex and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 Bun. L. Rev. 37, 50 (1982) (noting that
La Buy "does represent a less restrictive attitude toward the use of the mandamus power");
Redish, supra note 36, at 114 ("In its 1957 decision in La Buy ... the Supreme Court ex-
panded considerably [mandamus's] potential scope."). In the decade or so prior to La
Buy, the Supreme Court had on several occasions rejected attempts to seek interlocutory
appellate review via writs of mandamus. In 1953, it affirmed the Fifth Circuit's refusal to
issue a writ of mandamus directed at a district court order transferring a case to another
federal district. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1953). In 1943,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's use of mandamus to overturn a district
court's refusal to quash an indictment. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn, 319 U.S. 21, 32
(1943).
155 McClellan v. Garland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910); sce Roche, 319 U.S. at 25 (noting
that the circuit court of appeals has authority to issue writs of mandamus in aid of its juris-
diction because "[c] therwise the appellate jurisdiction could be ... thwarted by unauthor-
ized action of the district court obstructing the appeal").
155 See McClellan, 217 U.S. at 280 (recognizing that a writ of mandamus was appropriate
to compel a trial court to proceed to final judgment).
154 See id. In McClellan the Court stated:
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appellate mandamus as a means of interlocutory review by the federal
courts of appeals. 155 It was "elementary" that a court of appeals' au-
thority to issue writs of mandamus was not to correct errors of law or
fact or to otherwise compel adjudication in a particular way. 156 "Man-
damus," the Court stated, "is an appropriate remedy to compel a judi-
cial officer to act" but may not be used as a "substitute for an appeal
or writ of error to dictate the manner of his action." 157
Following La Buy's lead, the Supreme Court endorsed appellate
mandamus in a number of other situations. The Court's 1964 decision
in Schlagenhauf v. Holder addressed the use of mandamus to review a
district court's decision to order mental and physical examinations un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. 158 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit had refused to issue a writ of mandamus, con-
cluding that mandamus was not appropriate to consider whether Rule
35's "good cause" requirement was satisfied. 158 The Supreme Court re-
versed the Seventh Circuit, finding that the court of appeals should
have determined the "good cause" issue on mandamus. 16° It noted that
the application of Rule 35 to defendants (rather than plaintiffs) pre-
Inasmuch as the order of the circuit court, staying the proceeding until after
final judgment in the state court, might prevent the adjudication of the ques-
tions involved, and thereby prevent a review thereof in the circuit court of
appeals, which had jurisdiction for that purpose, we think that court had
power to issue the writ Of mandamus to require the circuit court to proceed
with and determine the action pending before it.
Id.
165 See La Buy, 352 U.S. at 262 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that La Buy was "a clear
departure by the Court of Appeals from the settled principles governing the issuance of
the extraordinary writs" and that the Court had "seriously undermined the long-standing
statutory policy against piecemeal appeals"). Some of the pre-La Buy Supreme Court cases
that are often cited to support robust mandamus authority involve issuance of writs of
mandamus by the Supreme Court itself, not by the courts of appeals. See generally Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); L.A. Brush
Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926); In re Skin-
ner Sc Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924); In re Simons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918). Reliance on such
cases is "misplaced" because unlike the federal courts of appeals, the Supreme Court is not
limited to "the strictly auxiliary power" provided under the All Writs Act. La Buy, 352 U.S.
at 265 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Whether or not one agrees with the result in La Buy, its
recognition of such mandamus authority in the federal courts of appeals was a significant
development.
156 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 393-
94 (1933).
157 Id. at 394.
1" 379 U.S. 104, 109 (1964).
159 Id. at 111 (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43, 52 (7th Cir. 1964)).
160 Id.
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sented an issue of first impression, as did the meaning of Rule 35's
"good cause" requirement. 161 Under these special circumstances, the
Court concluded that mandamus was proper "to settle new and impor-
tant problems."162
A decade later, the Supreme Court's 1976 opinion in Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer stated that mandamus was appropriate
to correct a district court's order remanding a case to state court be-
cause its crowded docket would severely impair plaintiffs' right of re-
dress. 163 The Supreme Court concluded that the removal statutes did
not allow the district court to remand a case simply because it consid-
ered itself too busy to try ILI" It then held that mandamus was appro-
priate "to prevent nullification of the removal statutes by remand or-
ders resting on grounds having no warrant in the law." 165 The Court
also rejected the argument that appellate mandamus was barred by 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that "Nil order remanding a case
to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on ap-
peal or otherwise." 166 The Court inferred that § 1447(d) barred ap-
pellate court scrutiny only for remand orders based on improper re-
moval or lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction—it did not bar
review of a remand order that, as in Thermtron, was based solely on the
district court's crowded docket. 167
The Supreme Court's next two mandamus decisions appeared to
scale back the availability of appellate mandamus. In Kerr v. U.S. Dis-
trict Court, a case decided just five months after Thermtron, the Court
affirmed the refusal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
to review via mandamus a discovery order compelling California
prison officials to provide personnel files and certain prisoner files. 168
The prison officials' mandamus petition argued that the documents
should not be produced without the district court reviewing them in
camera to determine whether plaintiffs' need for them outweighed
161 Id.
164 id
163 423 U.S. 336,340-41 (1976).
I" Id. at 344-45.
1 €8 Id. at 353.
166 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000).
167 Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-52 (allowing appellate review via a writ of mandamus for
remand orders based on grounds other than improvident removal or lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction). See generally Michael E. Solirnine, Remova4 Remands, and Reforming Federal
Appellate Review, 58 Mo. L. REv. 287 (1993),
168 Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,395-99 (1976).
1262	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 48:1237
their confidentiality. 169 The Supreme Court held that mandamus was
improper because the prison officials were free to make a request for
such in camera review in the district court as an initial matter.'"
Two years later, in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court reversed the grant of a writ of mandamus by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ordering the district court "to pro-
ceed immediately" to adjudicate a federal securities law claim, despite
the pendency of a substantially identical proceeding between the
same parties in the Illinois state courts. 171 In a plurality opinion writ-
ten by Justice Rehnquist, the Court acknowledged that appellate man-
damus may be available when "a district court obstinately refuses to
adjudicate a matter properly before it," but concluded that the plain-
tiff had neither alleged nor proved such a refusal to proceed.'" The
plurality noted that the sparse record before it did not support an in-
ference that the district court had simply "abated the [federal law]
claim in deference to the state proceedings." 1" The plurality con-
cluded that, so far as it appeared, "the delay in adjudicating the dam-
ages claim [was] simply a product of the normal excessive load of
business in the District Court." 174
In 1989, however, the Supreme Court in Mallard v. U.S. District
Court once again endorsed appellate mandamus.'" In that case, the
Court held that appellate mandamus was proper to challenge a district
court's refusal to grant an attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel for
indigent inmates in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prison conditions lawsuit.' 76 The
attorney had been appointed involuntarily under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d)'s
provision that "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent" an
indigent litigant.'" The Court first found that the term "request" in
§ 1915(d) did not authorize a district court to compel an attorney to rep-
169 Id. at 404.
170 Id. (noting "the opportunity for petitioners to return to the District Court, assert
the privilege more specifically and through responsible officials, and then have their re-
quest for an in camera review of the materials by the District Court reconsidered in a differ-
ent light").
111 437 U.S. 655,657 (1978) (plurality opinion).
172 Id. at 666-67. Justice Blackmun, who provided the fifth and deciding vote against
granting the writ, did not join Justice Rehnquist's opinion. He reasoned that the court of
appeals' issuance of the writ of mandamus was premature for other reasons. Id. at 656-67
(Blackmun, J.).
173 Id. at 667.
174 Id.
175 490 U.S. 296,309-10 (1989).
176 Id. at 299-300.
177 Id. at 301.
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resent such a litigant. 178 The Court then concluded that appellate
mandamus was appropriate because, given the correct interpretation of
§ 1915(d), the district court "plainly acted beyond its 'jurisdiction'.
In addition, [the appointed attorney] had no alternative remedy avail-
able to him."'"
The Supreme Court's most recent endorsement of appellate
mandamus was its 2004 decision in Cheney v. U.S. District Court.' s° The
district court in Cheney had authorized the plaintiffs to seek "'tightly-
reined' discovery" from Vice President Dick Cheney regarding the
structure and membership of the National Energy Policy Develop-
ment Group. 181 The U.S: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied
Cheney's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that it had "no
authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus" 182 in
light of the fact that Cheney remained free to assert executive privi-
lege in response to particular discovery requests. 183 The Supreme
Court vacated the D.C. Circuit's denial of the writ because the court
of appeals had failed to give adequate consideration to separation of
powers concerns, namely, whether judicial discovery directed at the
Vice President "constituted an unwarranted impairment of another
branch in the performance of its constitutional duties." 184 The Su-
preme Court concluded that the D.C. Circuit had "prematurely ter-
minated its inquiry" into Cheney's separation of powers objections
based on the mistaken assumption that he must first assert executive
privilege in response to particular discovery requests.' The Court
did not, however, require the D.C. Circuit to grant the writ of man-
damus. 186 Rather, it remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further
consideration, recognizing that "the issuance of the writ is a matter
vested in the discretion of the court to which the petition is made." 181
Unlike the collateral order doctrine's oft-cited multipart test, the
Supreme Court has not provided a consistent set of requirements for
appellate mandamus. Its most recent guidance came in Cheney, where
178 Id. at 301-07.
179 Id. at 309.
la° 542 U.S. 367, 379-80 (2004).
lel Id. at 375 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 54 (D.D.C. 2002)).
lee Id. at 377 (quoting In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
I" Id. at 376 (citing In re Cheney, 334 F.3d at 1109).
'TM Id. at 390.
'a' Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391.
lee Id.
Ili Id.
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the Court stressed that mandamus must not be used as a substitute for
the regular appeals process.'" It added:
The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to
confine the court against which mandamus is sought to a law-
ful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction. Although courts
have not confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical
definition of "jurisdiction," only exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial "usurpation of power" or a "clear
abuse of discretion" will justify the invocation of this extraor-
dinary remedy.'"
The Cheney Court then articulated three conditions that must be
satisfied for a writ of mandamus to issue.'" First, the party seeking
issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the
relief he desires.'91 Second, the petitioner must show that his right to
issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." 192 Third, "even if the
first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate un-
der the circumstances." 193 Other Supreme Court decisions, however,
do not echo this three-part test. Neither La Buy, Schlagenhauf, nor
Thermtron, for example, mentions Cheney's requirements that there be
no other adequate means of obtaining the relief sought or that the
right to mandamus be clear and indisputable. 194
Several federal courts of appeals have sought to crystallize the
Supreme Court's inconsistent messages into their own frameworks for
determining when mandamus is appropriate. Most prominent is the
so-called Bauman test, which identifies five conditions that might jus-
tify appellate mandamus:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires;
(2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
not correctable on appeal; (3) The district court's order is
'aB Id, at 380-81.
1119 Id. at 380 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
190
	
542 U.S. at 380-81.
191 Id. (citing Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
192 Id. (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403; Bankers Lift E..e Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384).
193 Id. (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403; Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 112 n.8).
194 See generally Thermtran, 423 U.S. 336; Schlagenhauf 379 U.S. 104; La Buy, 352 U.S.
249.	 •
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clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) The district court's
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent dis-
regard of the federal rules; or (5) The district court's order
raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first
impression)"
For courts that use this approach, it is not necessary that all five con-
ditions be present to warrant mandamus.' Nor does the presence of
one or more of these factors automatically trigger review via appellate
mandamus—whether to grant the writ is always up to the appellate
court's discretion.'" Although the Supreme Court has yet to approve
of this five-factor framework, several federal appellate courts have
employed it. 198
2. Procedures for Invoking Appellate Mandamus
A litigant who wishes to seek appellate mandamus must file a pe-
tition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals.' 99 Such a peti-
tion is not formally an appeal, however. It actually initiates an entirely
new action—an original action—in the court of appeals. 2" Formally,
the petitioner is seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the district
court judge to do whatever it is the aggrieved party believes should
have been done initially. Thus, the petitioner must serve the petition
on the judge personally, as well as on all the parties."' Up until 1996,
the judge was formally the respondent in the mandamus proceed-
195 Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977).
196 See id. at 655; see also In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the test does "not require that every element be met").
191 E.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc., v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.
1999) ("Mandamus review is at bottom discretionary—even where the Bauman factors are
satisfied, the court may deny the petition."); see also Berger, supra note 151, at 38 (noting
that 'mandamus . . . provides a means for discretionary interlocutory appellate review").
ma E.g., In is Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Bauman factors
are "instructive"); In is Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1984);
see also Dew v. United States, 48 M.J. 639, 648-49 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1998); Waters, supra
note 6, at 594 n.295 (noting that other circuits have adopted the Bauman factors or other
similar factors). But see Berger, supra note 151, at 90 (noting that the Bauman factors "were
simply drawn from cases without any evaluation of their propriety or the practical effects of
using them").
199 See FED. R. APP. P. 21(a) (1) ("A party petitioning for a writ of mandamus or prohi-
bition directed to a court must File a petition with the circuit clerk with proof of service on
all parties to the proceeding in the trial court. The party must also provide a copy to the
trial-court judge.").
204 See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 3932.
2°' FED. R. APP. P. 21(a).
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ings. 202 Although this is no longer the case, the appellate court may
still authorize or order the trial court judge to respond. 2°2
A petition for a writ of mandamus must state "(i) the relief sought;
(ii) the issues presented; (iii) the facts necessary to understand the is-
sue presented by the petition; and (iv) the reasons why the writ should
issue."2" To succeed, therefore, a party must convince the court of ap-
peals both that appellate mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for inter-
locutory review and that the district court's ruling was incorrect. The
mandamus petition must thus present argument on both appellate "ju-
risdiction" (i.e., whether the appellate court should exercise its discre-
tion to review the order via mandamus) and the substantive merits of
the appeal.
There is no formal deadline for filing a mandamus petition. The
Supreme Court has held that the ordinary deadlines for filing notices
of appeal do not apply to petitions for writs of mandamus. 205 Rather,
the timeliness of a mandamus petition is measured by much murkier
standards. Laches might bar a mandamus petition if the petitioner
slept upon his rights, especially if that delay was prejudicial to the
other party. 206 One court of appeals has explained the issue this way:
"As with all remedies that are governed by equitable principles, man-
damus must be sought with reasonable promptness. There is no in-
flexible rule on timeliness and we hesitate to create any." 207
D. Problems with Appellate Mandamus
Appellate mandamus is problematic for several reasons. First, us-
ing the writ of mandamus as a method of appellate review does not
comport with the historic understanding of the writ. Second, the Su-
preme Court's guidance on when appellate mandamus is appropriate
is inconsistent and fails to reflect its actual use. Third, the process for
invoking appellate mandamus is cumbersome and inefficient.
202 See In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d at 223 n.7 (citing the 1996 amendments to FED.
R. APP. P. 21).
203 FED, R. APP, P. 21(b) (4).
204 Id. 21 (a) (2) (B) .
205 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 378.
20'6 Id. at 379 (citing Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348, 355 (1883)).
207 United States v. Olds, 426 F.2d 562, 565-66 (3d Cir. 1970); see In is Rappaport, 558
F.2d 87, 90 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[D]elay in seeking mandamus may itself prove fatal to the
petition."); 20A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 321.10(1) (3d
ed. 2006) ("Although there is no express time limit on filing a petition, failure to seek
prompt relief may result in denial of the relief sought.") (internal citation omitted). •
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The statutory foundation for appellate mandamus is fairly sensi-
ble. The All Writs Act provides: -The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Acts of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the us-
ages and principles of law."2°8 Although a court of appeals' jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 traditionally requires a final judgment by
the district court, this jurisdiction has always included review of the
interlocutory orders leading to that final judgment. 209 Any interlocu-
tory order, therefore, may eventually be within the appellate court's
jurisdiction because it can be reviewed once the district court reaches
a final judgment. Thus, it is plausible and textually sound to read ap-
pellate mandamus as'appropriate in aid of" 21° the jurisdiction that
will exist once a "final decision" 211 is reached. The fact that appellate
mandamus is a discretionary basis for review also fits nicely with the
All Writs Act's discretionary language: "[A] 11 courts established by
Acts of Congress may issue all writs .. . "212
What is puzzling, however, is why—of "all" the "writs" available—
the Supreme Court endorsed mandamus as the vehicle for obtaining
what is essentially appellate review of interlocutory trial court orders.
Mandamus has always been classified as an "extraordinary" writ, even
when it is not used as a means of interlocutory appellate review. 2" In
this sense, mandamus is an awkward fit for what is essentially discre-
tionary appellate review of interlocutory orders. As Professor
Rosenberg noted two decades ago, mandamus "has become an ordi-
nary rather than an extraordinary route of appeal." 2" Indeed, to fit
the traditional elements of mandamus, a litigant must initiate an en-
tirely new action in the appellate court seeking a writ commanding
the trial court judge as an individual officer to correct what was done
or not done in the trial court. 215
"a 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000).
"a See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (noting that on ap-
peal from a final judgment "claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may
be ventilated") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
210 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
211 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). .
212 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (emphasis added).
213 E.g., United States ex rel. Bernadin v. Seymour, 10 App. D.C. 294, *4 (D.C. Cir.
1897).
214 Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 174.
215 Accordingly, there is a perception that district court judges view appellate manda-
mus as a more personally hostile device than a conventional appeal. See Berger, supra note
151, at 87 ("The writ has been said to be extraordinary and is viewed that way by federal
judges.... Mo be 'mandamused' is a particularly strong rebuke that often will be taken
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Historically, mandamus was not a vehicle for federal appellate
courts to reverse or vacate lower court orders. In the decade following
the creation of the circuit courts of appeals in 1891, their decisions
were replete with language indicating that mandamus is not to be
used to obtain appellate review of interlocutory orders. In 1900, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained it this way:
When a question has been decided by the officer or person
to whose judgment or discretion the law has entrusted its de-
termination, the writ of mandamus may not issue to review
or reverse that decision, or to compel another. It may issue
to command judicial officers to hear and to decide a ques-
tion within their jurisdiction, but courts have no power by
writ of mandamus to direct such officers how they shall de-
cide such a question, or in whose favor they shall render
their judgment. 216
Indeed, a thorough review of the courts of appeals' first ten years
of published decisions reveals not a single instance where a writ of
mandamus was used as the sort of appellate vehicle that it has since
become.217 Although there are some examples during this time pe-
more personally."); Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity as a Means of Reducing Judicial
Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the
Civil Justice Reform. Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 521 (1993) ("[Ns a regular litigator in the
federal courts, it's hard enough to file a mandamus petition.") (quoting Hearings of the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 133 (1992) (Statement of Alan Morri-
son, Esq.)). This concern has been ameliorated somewhat by 1996 amendments to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. Under the new rule, a judge is no longer formally a party
to the mandamus action, although she must be served copies of the mandamus petition,
and the appellate court may authorize or order her to provide a personal response to the
petition. See FED. R. APP. P. 21(a), (b); cf. Berger, supra note 151, at 86 (suggesting in 1982
that one "policy basis underlying the reluctance to employ mandamus" was "the fact that
the district judge is a litigant"). The 1996 amendments were motivated by a desire to clarify
that "[iln most instances, a writ of mandamus ... is not actually directed to a judge in any
more personal way than is an order reversing a court's judgment." FED. R. APP. P. 21 advi-
sory committee notes (note to the 1996 amendments).
216 Kimberlin v. Comm'n to Five Civilized Tribes, 104 F. 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1900); see,
e.g., James v. Cent. Trust Co. of N.Y,, 108 F. 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1901) (denying a writ of
mandamus to challenge the trial court's compliance with the court of appeals' decree and
noting that "if ... a mistake in recital has been made, Or an error of judgment committed,
the writ of mandamus is not the remedy, but that an additional appeal must be sued out to
correct the same" and that "if that court erred in disposing of the matters remanded to it
by this court, not specified in the mandate, the remedy is by appeal, and not by manda-
mus"); The New York, 104 F. 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1900) ("[I]f the court erred in refusing to
allow such recoupment, the remedy is by appeal, and not by mandamus.").
217 The cases reviewed by the author are listed infra, app. tbl.2.
2007]	 Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction 	 1269
riod where a federal court of appeals directed a writ of mandamus to
a lower court, they are qualitatively different from the sort of appel-
late review for which mandamus is used today. In 1898 in Scaifi v. West-
ern North Carolina Land Co., for example, the lower court judge had
refused to settle a bill of exceptions, which was a necessary prerequi-
site to reaching a final judgment."' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus: "In the case before us the
writ will issue, commanding the judge to settle a bill of exceptions ac-
cording to the facts as they took place before him on the trial of this
action, as he may find them, and when so settled to sign it." 219 To re-
quire the judge merely to settle the bill of exceptions according to the
facts as he may find them is not to second-guess or influence the ulti-
mate content of the judge's factual findings; it is merely to require
him to do what the taxpayers are paying him to do—to make some
findings. Thus, the examples where courts of appeals issued writs of
mandamus at federal trial courts are not situations where the lower
court simply made a ruling that was incorrect in the eyes of the appel-
late court. Rather, the lower court utterly failed to decide an issue that
it was required to decide. 220
Another problem is that the Supreme Court's purported "re-
quirements" for appellate mandamus obscure, rather than illuminate,
how the writ is actually used. For example, the Court has stated re-
cently that the mandamus petitioner must show that her right to the
writ is "clear and indisputable."22' In Mallard, however, the petitioner's
right to the writ hinged on how the Court resolved a circuit split over
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorized district court's to compel at-
torneys to represent indigent prisoners. 222 Can it really be said that
the petitioner's right to reversal-by-mandamus is "clear and indisput-
21° 87 F. 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1898),
219 Id. at 311.
220 Cf. Interstate Commerce Commit, 289 U.S. at 394 ("Mandamus is an appropriate rem-
edy to compel a judicial officer to act. It may not be used as a substitute for an appeal or
writ of error to dictate the manner of his action.").
221 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (IT] he petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that
his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.") (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Mallard, 490 U.S. at 309 ("[P]etitioners must ... carry the burden of
showing that their right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
222 Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300 & n.2, 309 (granting the writ of mandamus because as we
decide today, § 1915(d) does not authorize coercive appointments of counsel") (emphasis
added).
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able"223
 when the district court's action was permissible under the
case law not only in its own circuit but in other circuits as well?
The same point could be made regarding other Supreme Court
decisions on appellate mandamus. In Schlagenhauf, the Court found
that appellate mandamus was proper even though the case involved
an issue of first impression regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
35 that had raised "new and important problems." 224 In Thermtron, the
Supreme Court's use of appellate mandamus depended on a novel
reading, of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the plain text of which precludes all
appellate court review of district court remand orders. 225 Under either
circumstance, it is a complete fiction to say that the petitioner's right
to the writ was "dear and indisputable." 228 Perhaps Schlagenhauf and
Thermtron can be justified on the basis that the petitioner's right to the
writ in those cases was "clear and indisputable" in light of the legal
interpretation provided during the court's consideration of the writ.
But an appellate court is always capable of providing a legal interpre-
tation that would make the proper result clear and indisputable. If
that is all that the "clear and indisputable" requirement entails, then
it provides no meaningful restriction on an appellate court's manda-
mus authority.
Other aspects of the Supreme Court's mandamus jurisprudence
are also problematic. As recently as the Cheney decision, the Court ob-
served that the purpose of appellate mandamus is solely to "confine
the court against which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction."227 Although such language is meant to high-
light that an appellate court's authority to review trial court rulings via
mandamus is limited, if read closely it creates no limitation at all. Not
even the most sweepingly intrusive appellate device can interfere with
a district court decision that lawfully exercised its prescribed jurisdic-
tion. So to state that mandamus is only permissible to confine a trial
court to a lawful exercise of its jurisdiction provides no guidance at all
for when, in fact, mandamus is appropriate—the purpose of every ap-
peal is to confine a court to the "lawful" exercise of its jurisdiction. 228
223 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381; Mallard, 490 U.S. at 309.
224 Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 111.
225 Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-52. See generally Solimine, supra note 167.
228 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381; Mallard, 490 U.S. at 309; see also Berger, supra note 151, at
46 ("How one establishes a clear and indisputable right to relief that is said to be discre-
tionary with the appellate court is also open to serious question.").
227 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380.
225 Cf. Berger, supra note 151, at 84-85 ("[Allmost any order that is reversible error
might be deemed a usurpation of power or excess of jurisdiction.").
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Equally unsatisfying is the notion that mandamus relief is only
appropriate when the petitioner has "no other adequate means to at-
tain the relief he desires."229 The "relief' that is "desire[d]" by some-
one who petitions for mandamus is the immediate correction of the
trial court's interlocutory ruling. The fact that the petitioner has em-
braced mandamus as a method of appellate review confirms that no
other method exists for obtaining immediate review. Thus, the "no
other adequate means" requirement provides little concrete guidance
and ultimately boils down to yet another circular policy judgment
about whether forcing the aggrieved party to wait for an appeal from
a final judgment is "adequate."2"
Finally, the procedural vehicle for invoking appellate mandamus
fits poorly with its role as a means for discretionary appellate review. A
party's petition for a writ of mandamus must address not only the "ju-
risdictional" question of whether the order is suitable for review via
appellate mandamus, 231 but also the merits of whether the order was
correct. 232 This is a puzzling approach, as evidenced by the fact that
every federal scheme that is explicitly designed to handle discretion-
ary appeals separates the threshold question of whether the court
should exercise its discretion to hear the appeal from the question of
whethei the order being reviewed was correct on the merits. 233 A liti-
gant seeking discretionary review from the U.S. Supreme Court first
files a petition for a writ of certiorari, which emphasizes why the case
is worthy of Supreme Court review. 234 Only after that writ is granted
does the case proceed to full briefing on the merits. 235
229 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380.
230 Cf. Berger, supra note 151, at 89 (`There is almost always some harm that cannot be
corrected on appeal. The question is what type of harm and what degree of harm should
be sufficient to authorize an immediate review by mandamus.").
231 Cf. id. at 76 (stating that the propriety of mandamus involves "a somewhat different
concept of appellate jurisdiction, that of an appellate screening device," but acknowledg-
ing that "(jurisdiction in the sense of the power to entertain the appeal is almost never the
question in a mandamus proceeding") (emphasis added).
232 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
233 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 5(a) (1); Sup. Cr. R. 14.1(h).
"4 See Sue. Cr. R. 14.1(h) (requiring a petition for certiorari to contain "[a] direct and
concise argument amplifying the reasons relied on for allowance of the writ"); id. 10 ("Re-
view on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for
a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.").
2" See id.16.2. Supreme Court Rule 16.2 states that:
Whenever the Court grants a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Clerk will
prepare, sign, and enter an order to that effect and will notify forthwith coun-
sel of record and the court whose judgment is to be reviewed. The case then
will be scheduled for briefing and oral argument.
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A similar procedure is used for litigants pursuing discretionary
appeals at the circuit level. Take for example a party who wishes to
invoke the Class Action Fairness Act's provision allowing discretionary
appeals of a district court's jurisdictional rulings. 236 The appellant
must first file a petition for permission to appeal under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 5. 237 This petition need not fully brief the
merits of the issue, but must simply persuade the appellate court to
exercise its discretion to hear the appeal. 238 Only after that petition is
granted does the case proceed to full briefing on the merits. 233 This
bifurcated approach is far more efficient than Appellate Rule 21's
procedure for writs of mandamus. 240 The fact that mandamus peti-
tions are not subject to any explicit time requirements only com-
pounds this in efficie cy. 24I
III. How THE CURRENT REGIME OPERATES IN PRACTICE
For all of the reasons explained above, the jurisdictional regime
that today's appellate courts have inherited from their mid-twentieth-
century ancestors is problematic on several levels. The federal courts,
however, have worked within the cumbersome doctrinal and proce-
dural framework to implement a system of interlocutory appellate re-
view that, in practice, is fairly sensible. If one looks at the results on
the ground—i.e., which interlocutory orders are immediately appeal-
able and which are not—the jurisdictional landscape is commend-
able. This Part summarizes how the current regime actually operates
in practice. 242
Id.
236 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c) (1) (West 2006) ("[A) court of appeals may accept an ap-
peal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class ac-
tion to the State court from which it was removed.").
232 See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a) (1) ("To request permission to appeal when an appeal is
within the court of appeals' discretion, a party must file a petition for permission to ap-
peal."); see also, e.g., Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Rule 5 applies to Class Action Fairness Act appeals).
238 See nap . R. APP. P. 5(b) (1) (requiring the petition to state "the reasons why the ap-
peal should be allowed").
233 See id. 5(d) (1) ("Within 10 days after the entry of the order granting permission to
appeal, the appellant must ... pay the district clerk all required fees."); id. 5(d) (3) ("The
district clerk Must notify the circuit clerk once the petitioner has paid the fees .... The
record must be forwarded and filed in accordance with Rules 11 and 12(c)."); id. 31(a) (1)
("The appellant must serve and file a brief within 40 days after the record is filed.").
246 See id. 21.
241 See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 243-277 and accompanying text.
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There is a limited category of identifiable orders—primarily or-
ders rejecting claims of governmental and other immunities from
suit—over which appellate courts have immediate, mandatory juris-.
diction.243 Litigants may appeal such orders as a matter of right, and
appellate courts lack discretion to decline review. 2" Orders rejecting a
president's claim of absolute immunity, a government official's claim
of qualified immunity, a state's claim of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, or a federal employee's claim of immunity under the Westfall Act
all fall within this category. 245
Interlocutory orders that have not been blessed with categorical
appealability under the collateral order doctrine may still be subject to
immediate appellate review, but such review is left to the appellate
court's discretion. Some appellate courts exercise such discretionary
review through the collateral order doctrine, using the "importance"
and "effectively unreviewable" requirements to identify particular rul-
ings that warrant immediate appellate review without rendering all
such orders appealable as of right. 246 Other appellate courts exercise
this discretion via appellate mandamus. 247
When viewed in the aggregate, appellate courts have exercised
this sort of discretionary review over a very broad range of interlocu-
tory orders, including:
1. Orders denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion; 248
243 See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
244
	 supra note 104 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text, The federal courts of appeals have
also unanimously held that an interlocutory denial of a foreign entity's claim of immunity
from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is also appealable as of right under
the collateral order doctrine. See supra note 95. The Supreme Court may have watered
down the appealability of immunity denials with its 1995 decision in Johnson u Jones, which
held that the collateral order doctrine did not allow an immediate appeal of an order de-
nying three police officers' summary judgment motion where the order "determines only
a question of 'evidence sufficiency.'" 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). This limitation arguably
(although not necessarily) narrows the scope of immunity-related orders that are categori-
cally appealable. The impact of Johnson is discussed in greater detail infra notes 361-373
and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., Diamond Venturei, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 895-98 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(reviewing discovery order via the collateral order doctrine); Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co„
913 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
247 see,
 e.g., In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.Sd 135, 140 (1st Cir. 2002) (reviewing via man-
damus a district court order compelling participation in alternative dispute resolution).
248 In re Impact Absorbent Tech., Inc., No. 96-3496, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Dec. 18,
1996).
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2. Orders denying a motion to dismiss or remand a case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction ;249
3. Orders denying a motion to remand on the basis of unauthorized
removal; 25°
4. Orders denying a motion to transfer venue;251
5. Orders granting a motion to transfer venue; 252
6. Orders refusing to find a case barred by collateral estoppe1; 253
7. Orders refusing to dismiss a case for failure to effect timely ser-
vice ;254
8. Orders compelling discovery;255
9. Orders compelling discovery of information claimed to be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege or work product pro-
tection;256
10. Orders refusing to compel discovery; 257
11. Orders refusing to impose a protective order limiting disclosure of
certain discovery materials; 256
12. Orders imposing a protective order limiting public disclosure of
certain discovery materials; 259
13. Orders compelling parties to participate in alternative dispute
resolution ; 260
14. Orders disqualifying an attorney ;261
15. Orders refusing to disqualify an attorney; 262
249 In re Hot-Hed, Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2007).
250 In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 1996).
221 In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 202-03 (5th Cir. 2004).
222 In re Warrick, 70 F.3d 736, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1995); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton &
Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993); Carteret Say. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225,
228 (3d Cir. 1990).
2" Miss. Chem, Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chem. Corp., 717 F,2d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
224 In re Cooper, 971 F.2d 640, 641 (11th Cir. 1992).
225 Diamond Ventures, 452 F.3d at 895-98; In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316
(11th Cir. 2003); SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir.
1999); In is Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 1991); Acosta, 913 F.2d at
207-08; City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1984); Hartley Pen Co.
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1961).
256 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 956 (3d Cir. 1997); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v.
Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994); In is Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 931-33
(8th Cir. 1994).
"7 W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1976).
226 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1111 (3d Cir. 1986).
229 In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1981).
262 In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d at 135.
261 In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1992).
262 In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1992).
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16. Orders imposing sanctions; 265
17. Orders dismissing a single defendant from a case (without entry of
partial judgmen t) ; 264
18. Orders refusing to require a party to post a security bond; 265
19. Orders requiring a party to post a security bond; 266
20. Orders denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a viable
claim;267
21. Orders denying a motion for summary judgment for failure to
raise a genuine issue of material fact;
22. Orders refusing to allow a trial by jury. 269
Although appellate courts exercise this discretionary review quite
sparingly, it is fair to say that no interlocutory trial court order is cate-
gorically beyond an appellate court's jurisdiction. 279 And over the last
quarter-century, the Supreme Court has (at least tacitly) encouraged
appellate mandamus, which is the primary means by which appellate
courts exercise this sort of discretionary review. It has been nearly
three decades since the Court last reversed an appellate court's use of
mandamus to review a district court's interlocutory ruling."' On sev-
262 In re Daimler-Chrysler, 294 F.3d 697, 698-99 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Cunningham v.
Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 211 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that man-
damus could be available to challenge discovery sanctions).
214 Special Invs. Inc. v. Aero Air Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2004).
285 Result Shipping Co. v. Ferruzzi Trading USA Inc., 56 F.3d 394, 398-99 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949).
"9 Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Wilmoth, 541 F.2d 463, 463-64 (4th Cir. 1976).
"7 Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1991); In refustices
of Supreme Court of P.R., 695 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.).
268 In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.). In the mid-
1990s, some federal appellate courts exercised discretionary review over class certification
orders using appellate mandamus. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1297-1304 (7th Cir. 1995). I have not included such orders in the preceding list because
since 1998, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) has explicitly authorized discretionary
appeals from class certification orders, rendering the use of mandamus largely unneces-
sary. See FED. R. Cm P. 23(f).
"9 Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959); In re Tech. Licensing Corp„
423 F.3d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hulsey v. West, 966 F.2d 579, 582-83 (10th Cir. 1992);
Myers v. U.S. Dist. Court, 620 F.2d 741, 742 (9th Cir. 1980).
279 One caveat to this point is that some statutes explicitly forbid appellate review of
particular orders. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) forbids review "by appeal or other-
wise" of an order "remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed." 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000). The Supreme Court has created a narrow exception to this rule,
see Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-52 (1976), but § 1447(d)
prevents appellate review for the vast majority of remand orders. See generally Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
271 See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 657 (1978).
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eral occasions, however, the Court has corrected an appellate court's
refusal to use appellate mandamus. 272
Because of the cumbersome doctrinal framework created by the
collateral order doctrine and appellate mandamus, courts and com-
mentators have yet to see the jurisdictional metastructure that has de-
veloped. As a policy matter, this practical structure has pragmatic
value, especially given how litigation has evolved in the decades since
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The widely-
documented "vanishing trial" 275 has led to fewer contested final judg-
ments. 274 In its place, pretrial judicial management has become in-
creasingly important, especially interlocutory decisions relating to ju-
risdiction, alternative dispute resolution, pleadings, class actions, dis-
covery, and summary judgment. 275 These pretrial matters are critical
because they dictate what posture the case will be in when the parties
reach (as they often do) a hard-fought, but unappealable, settle-
ment.276 Under this new model of adjudication, strict adherence to
the final judgment rule might not allow for meaningful appellate re-
view of the trial court decisions that really matter. 277
IV. REINVENTING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This Part proposes a reinvention of appellate jurisdiction that
would maintain the current regime's pragmatic substantive structure
but cure its conceptual, doctrinal, and procedural problems. 278 As ap-
plied in practice, the current regime draws sensible lines between in-
terlocutory orders that are immediately subject to appellate review
and those that are not. 275 Some identifiable categories of interlocu-
tory orders are immediately appealable as of right. All other inter-
locutory orders are potentially appealable at the discretion of the ap-
r2 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,392 (2004) (vacating the D.C. Circuit's
refusal to grant a writ of mandamus for further consideration); Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court,
490 U.S. 296,309 (1989) (reversing the Eighth Circuit's refusal to grant a writ of manda-
mus).
273 E.g., Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 33, at 459; Redish, supra note 33, at
1329.
274 See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 12, at 646-64.
275 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 33, at 1264-65; Kanji, supra note 35, at 513; Resnik, su-
pra note 33, at 378-79; Yeazell, supra note 12, at 646-64.
276 See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 12, at 656-60.
277 See, e.g., Kanji, supra note 35, at 513; Waters, supra note 6, at 551-59; Yeazell, supra
note 12, at 646-64.
278 See infra notes 279-389 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 242-277 and accompanying text.
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pellate court, although appellate courts have invoked this discretion
quite sparingly. The confusion and incoherence inherent in the col-
lateral order doctrine and appellate mandamus have obscured this
basic structure. This Part argues that appellate jurisdiction can be re-
invented in a way that would simplify the current approach and per-
mit candid consideration of the concerns that affect whether appel-
late jurisdiction should be exercised.2" And it can be reinvented in a
way that fits better with the statutory foundations for federal appellate
jurisdiction and optimizes the procedural mechanisms for pursuing
appellate review of interlocutory orders.
This reinvention would recognize that the most important distinc-
tion for purposes of appellate jurisdiction is not the distinction between
the collateral order doctrine and appellate mandamus. Rather, it is the
distinction between interlocutory orders for which appellate jurisdic-
tion is mandatory (limited to certain identifiable categories of orders)
and interlocutory orders for which appellate jurisdiction is discretion-
ary (all other interlocutory orders). This Part proposes two new theo-
ries of appellate jurisdiction that will accomplish this goal. 2" First,
courts should recognize that the All Writs Act authorizes discretionary
appeals of interlocutory orders, and that such appeals are a superior
method for conducting discretionary appellate review than either the
collateral order doctrine or appellate mandamus. 282 Second, courts
should recognize that for the limited category of interlocutory orders
over which appellate jurisdiction is mandatory, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
provides a more coherent doctrinal foundation than the collateral or-
der doctrine. 2"
Although this solution would change quite drastically the doc-
trinal and procedural vehicles for invoking an appellate court's juris-
diction over interlocutory rulings, it could leave the underlying sub-
stantive structure in place. Some identifiable categories of interlocu-
tory orders would be immediately appealable as of right, whereas all
other interlocutory orders would be potentially appealable at the dis-
cretion of the appellate court.284 Preservation of this general substan-
288 See infra notes 281-389 and accompanying text.
281 See infra notes 284-373 and accompanying text.
282 See infra notes 286-342 and accompanying text.
m3 See infra notes 343-373 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 242-277 and accompanying text.
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tive approach mitigates stare decisis concerns that might otherwise
counsel against such a reinvention of prevailing doctrine. 285
A. Reinventing Discretionary Appellate Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Orders:
Appeals Under the All Writs Ad
This Section argues that., although the current system is correct
in seeing the All Writs Act as a source of authority for interlocutory
appellate review, courts have seized on the wrong "writ" for engaging
in such review. 286 Courts and commentators have thus far overlooked
the possibility that the All Writs Act authorizes appeals (not just writs of
mandamus), and that such appeals would be a better, more coherent
way for appellate courts to engage in discretionary review of inter-
locutory orders. This Section also responds to potential critiques of
this approach. 287
1. The Availability and Advantages of All Writs Act Appeals
Under the prevailing approach to appellate jurisdiction, writs of
mandamus are the only vehicles for obtaining appellate review of in-
terlocutory orders under the All Writs Act. As explained above, appel-
late mandamus is historically, doctrinally, and procedurally problem-
atic. 288 A superior reinvention of appellate jurisdiction should recog-
nize that the All Writs Act authorizes not only writs of mandamus but
also appeals. 289 The kind of discretionary appeals currently handled
by either appellate mandamus and the collateral order doctrine
should instead be handled by discretionary, interlocutory appeals un-
der the All Writs Act.
The textual argument for All Writs Act appeals is based on the
interplay between the MI Writs Act and twentieth-century legislation
that aimed to make appeals (rather than writs of error) the principal
285 Such a "reconceptualization" or a "rerationalization" of an existing framework is
not inconsistent with stare decisis, but rather is a core part of the common law process. See
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997,2035 (1994) (noting that "as
Oliver Wendell Holmes discerned, the common law evolves through a process of reration-
alization"); id. at 2037-38 . ("M he common law enterprise of reconceptualization pro-
ceeds at the level of theory supporting legal rules, not legal rules themselves."). My argu-
ment, essentially, is that what federal appellate courts are currently doing may be reration-
alized to stand on more solid doctrinal footing.
288 See infra notes 287-308 and accompanying text.
287 See infra notes 309-342 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 208-241 and accompanying text.
289 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
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method of appellate review in the federal system. In 1948, Congress
enacted a statute providing that "[all! Acts of Congress referring to
writs of error shall be construed as amended to the extent necessary
to substitute appeal for writ of error."290 The All Writs Act authorizes
"all courts established by Act of Congress" (including the courts of
appeals) to issue "all writs" (including writs of error) that are "neces-
sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions."291 Because
the All Writs Act authorizes federal appellate courts to issue writs of
error, the 1948 statute requires the All Writs Act to be "construed as
amended to the extent necessary to substitute appeal for writ of er-
ror."2" Accordingly, the All Writs Act authorizes "appeal [s] " that are
"in aid of" a federal appellate court's jurisdiction. 293
Based on this logic, courts could justify current forms of discre-
tionary appellate review—whether via the collateral order doctrine or
mandamus—as simply "appeals" under the All Writs Act. Recognizing
interlocutory All Writs Act appeals would not necessarily require any
change to the substantive principles governing what is currently ap-
pellate mandamus. Courts could continue to apply the Bauman fac-
tors, for example. 294 But instead of guiding a court's discretion to is-
299 Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 23, 62 Stat. 869, 990.
291 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
292 § 23, 62 Stat. at 990.
2°3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); § 23, 62 Stat. at 990.
See Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). Factors to be
considered are whether: (1) the party has no other adequate means, such as a direct ap-
peal, to attain the relief he or she desires; (2) the party will be damaged or prejudiced in a
way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a mat-
ter of law; (4) the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent
disregard of the federal rules; or (5) the district court's order raises new and important
problems, or issues of law of first impression. Id. The Bauman factors are not perfect, of
course. Indeed, they reflect some of the same conceptual problems inherent in the Su-
preme Court's mandamus jurisprudence. As discussed supra notes 229-230 and accompa-
nying text, inquiring whether a party seeking mandamus has "no other adequate means"
to attain the relief desired provides little meaningful guidance on when mandamus is ap-
propriate; nor would it provide meaningful guidance on when an All Writs Act appeal
would be appropriate. That said, the Bauman factors do highlight legitimate considera-
tions that should inform whether a discretionary interlocutory appeal would be proper
under my view of the All Writs Act, Appellate courts should certainly consider the extent to
which "the party will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal.° In-
quiring whether the district court's order "raises new and important problems or issues of
law of first impression" correctly recognizes the value of providing appellate court guid-
ance on new legal issues, particularly issues that might otherwise evade appellate scrutiny
altogether. And all other things being equal, a district court's order that is "clearly errone-
ous" is probably more deserving of immediate correction than one which is merely erro-
neous. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a complete list of the factors that
ought to inform an appellate court's decision whether to hear a discretionary All Writs Act
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sue writs of mandamus, these factors would guide the court's discre-
tion to hear appeals. The All Writs Act is discretionary (a court "may"
act in aid of its jurisdiction), and it is just as proper for courts to de-
velop principles to guide their discretion to hear appeals, as it is for
them to develop such principles to guide their discretion to issue a
writ of mandamus.295
There are several benefits that would flow from this approach.
First, it would solve the problem that mandamus's modern-day use as
a device for obtaining interlocutory appellate review chafes against its
historical understanding. 296 Instead, the vehicle for invoking appellate
review under the All Writs Act would be an aeat—a procedural de-
vice explicitly designed for this purpose.
Second, this solution would simplify the procedures currently
required for obtaining appellate review under the All Writs Act. No
longer would parties be required to file a separate action in the court
of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. Rather, parties would employ
the same means by which they would pursue any other permissive ap-
peals in a federal appellate court—a petition for permission to appeal
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. 297 In a Rule 5 petition,
the required briefing is limited to the threshold question of whether
an interlocutory appeal is appropriate. 298 Thus, using Rule 5 would
allow the court to decide whether it wants to hear the discretionary
appeal before full briefing on the merits. 299 This is more efficient than
appeal. Cf. Solimine & Hines, supra note 73, at 1577 ("It is neither necessary nor desirable
to formulate an exclusive list of factors informing the courts of appeals' decisions whether
to permit, under Rule 23(0, a challenge to a class certification order."). An excellent start-
ing point, however, would be the factors identified in RICHARD H. FALLon, JR., DANIEL.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1561-62 (5th ed. 2003) (describing "a number of factors that may favor
earlier appeals in particular cases," including (1) the avoidance of hardship" that would
result from postponing an appeal, (2) "the need to oversee the work of the lower courts on
matters that seldom if ever arise on appeal from a final judgment," and (3) "the conserva-
tion of the time and energy of courts and litigants by correction of error at an early
stage").
295 Appeals under the All Writs Act would also be "in aid of" the appellate jurisdiction
that would exist when a "final decision" occurs in the future. See supra notes 208-211 and
accompanying text. This theory would be similar to the one that the federal courts have
already accepted with respect to appellate mandamus under the All Writs Act See supra
notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
2136 See supra notes 213-220 and accompanying text.
"7 FED. R. APP. P. 5.
298 Id. 5(b) (1); see supra note 237-239 and accompanying text
2119 See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text. To be sure, a party seeking to con-
vince a court to employ a discretionary means of interlocutory review would want to make
a compelling argument that he should also prevail on the merits. But this is no different
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current mandamus practice, which requires the party seeking review
to present both the reasons why mandamus is an appropriate means of
review and the reasons why the petition should be granted. 30°
Finally, allowing interlocutory All Writs Act review to occur via
appeal rather than mandamus would do away with the procedural
oddity that mandamus petitions are not subject to any formal dead-
lines. By channeling what is now mandamus practice into Appellate
Rule 5, such appeals would now be subject to the predictable time pe-
riods set forth in that rule."'
This same approach would apply to interlocutory appeals that are
currently justified under the collateral order doctrine but that are, in
practice, a form of discretionary appellate review. 302 Using an All Writs
Act appeal would ameliorate the problems that arise when "discre-
tionary" collateral order review is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 303 For an
All Writs Act appeal, it would not matter that the elements of the col-
lateral order doctrine test cannot be reconciled with the term "final
decision" because the basis for an All Writs Act appeal is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, not § 1291. 3°4 Section 1651 is a more solid foundation for such
discretionary appeals because it provides that the court of appeals
"may,"303 not "shall,"306 invoke its authority. Treating "discretionary"
Collateral order appeals as All Writs Act appeals would also enable a
more suitable procedural device to be used, namely, a petition for
permission under Appellate Rule 5. 307 As described above, this allows
the appellate court to decide early on whether immediate appellate
than a party seeking certiorari review from the U.S. Supreme Court. There is an important
distinction between arguing that an issue is worthy of review and arguing that one should
prevail on the merits. By allowing what is now mandamus review to proceed under Rule 5,
the parties can concentrate their efforts more effectively on the first question and address
the second question if the appellate court agrees to hear the appeal.
500 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
sot See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a) (2) (requiring that a Rule 5 petition be filed "within the time
provided by Rule 4(a) for filing a notice of appeal"); id. 4(a) (1) (A) (requiring that a no-
tice of appeal in civil cases must be filed within thirty days).
932 See supra notes 132-183 and accompanying text.
303 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
304 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
sos 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (" [A] II courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.") (emphasis added).
3" 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts.") (emphasis added). •
307 See FED. R. APP. P. 5.
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review is appropriate."8 That issue can and should be resolved before
the parties have done extensive briefing on the merits of the appeal.
2. Responses to Potential Critiques of All Writs Act Appeals
This Section responds to two potential objections to allowing ap-
peals under the All Writs Act. 309 The first such objection could be that
under traditional common law, writs of error could not be sought to
review interlocutory trial court decisions. 31° The All Writs Act allows
writs only where use of the writ is "agreeable to the usages and princi-
ples of law."311 Thus, one might argue, the All Writs Act should not be
construed to allow appeals over interlocutory orders that would not
have been subject to writs of error at common law.
This objection is contrary to the settled understanding of the All
Writs Act. The phrase "agreeable to the usages and principles of law"
has never been construed to require strict compliance with common
law requirements for particular writs. 312 Especially telling is the Su-
preme Court's decision in Price v. Johnston, decided in 1948313 just
one year before the Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. decision
that marked the beginning of our present framework for appellate
jurisdiction.314 Price held that the All Writs Act authorized a writ of ha-
beas corpus even under circumstances that were not authorized un-
der common law. 313 The Court reasoned:
[W]e do not conceive that a circuit court of appeals, in issu-
ing a writ of habeas corpus under [the All Writs Act], is nec-
essarily confined to the precise forms of that writ in vogue at
the common law or in the English judicial system. [The All
Writs Act] says that the writ must be agreeable to the usages
and principles of "law," a term which is unlimited by the
common law or the English law. And ... "law" is not a static
concept, but expands and develops as new problems arise. 316
938 See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
3°9 See infra notes 310-342 and accompanying text.
''° See generally Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 91 YALE
L.J. 539 (1932).
3" 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
912 see a
513 See generally 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
314 See 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
315 Price, 344 U.S. at 282.
315 Id.
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Accordingly, the Court refused to read the All Writs Act "as an ossifi-
cation of the practice and procedure of more than a century and a
half ago" but rather as a "legislatively approved source of procedural
instruments designed to achieve 'the rational ends of law.'"317 Giving
appellate courts discretion to hear appeals (qua writs of error) under
the All Writs Act would surely comport with the rational ends of law. 318
This would be a sensible "develop[ment] "319 to respond to the "new
problems"'2° that rigid adherence to the final judgment rule would
pose in the current era of civil litigation."'
A second potential objection to All Writs Act appeals might be
that allowing such appeals would conflict with dicta in two more re-
cent Supreme Court decisions. In the 1985 decision Pennsylvania Bu-
reau of Correction v. U.S. Marshals Service, the Court held that in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances, the All Writs Act did not author-
ize a federal district court to order federal marshals to transport state
prisoners to a federal courthouse to testify in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ac-
tion.322 In 2002, in Syngenta Prop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, the Court
refused to read the All Writs Act to allow removal of a state court ac-
tion to federal court.323 In both opinions, the Court stated that
"[w] here a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it
is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. "924
Based on this dicta, one might argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 1292
"specifically address[] " jurisdiction over appeals and, therefore, pre-
clude reliance on the All Writs Act to authorize appeals not covered
by those sections. 325
This potential response represents too simplistic a reading of
Syngenta and Pennsylvania Bureau, and it contravenes the settled un-
317 Id. Price 's holding with respect to the scope of the All Writs Act remains good law.
Another aspect of the Price decision, however, was abrogated by McCkskey v. Zant. 499 U.S.
467, 483 (1991) (abrogating Price with respect to the 'abuse of the writ" standard that ap-
plies to frequent filers of habeas corpus petitions).
318 Price 334 U.S. at 282.
319
3" Id.
331 See supra notes 273-277 and accompanying text (explaining how the increased im-
portance of pretrial procedure justifies expanded appellate review of interlocutory rul-
ings).
3" 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
323 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002). For a pre-Syngenta analysis of whether the All Writs Act au-
thorizes removal, see generally Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of judicial Activism: Re-
moved Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773 (2000).
534 Id. at 32 (quoting Pa. Bureau of Corn, 474 U.S. at 43).
535 Set 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2000).
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derstanding of the All Writs Act. Interestingly, the notion that All
Writs Act relief is unavailable where a statute specifically addresses the
particular issue at hand stems from statutory language that was re-
moved from the All Writs Act in the 1940s. 326 An earlier version of the
All Writs Act had been limited to "all writs not specifically provided for by
statute."327 This qualification no longer exists, however.328 Further-
more, the dicta in Syngenta and Pennsylvania Bureau are contrary to
the settled understanding of the All Writs Act that existed when that
language was in the statute.329 Again, the Supreme Court's 1948 deci-
sion in Price is instructive.330 There, the Court held that federal courts
had authority under the All Writs Act to command that a prisoner be
brought before the court to argue his case."' The Court acknowl-
edged that the All Writs Act authorized only "writs not specifically
provided for by statute" and that the order at issue was "in the nature
of a writ of habeas corpus."332 Obviously, there were statutes on the
books in 1948 that "specifically addresse[d]" when a writ of habeas
corpus may be issued.333 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the
All Writs Act authorized such an order. 334
Thus, it is not the case that a statutory reference to a particular
writ prevents the All Writs Act from justifying the same writ in other
circumstances. Naturally, a court need not rely on the All Writs Act if
the particular use of the writ is "specifically provided for" by some
other statute. But contrary to the dicta in Syngenta and Pennsylvania
Bureau, the All Writs Act is not rendered impotent simply because a
statute authorizes the writ in situations other than the particular one
326 See Pa. Bureau of Corr, 474 U.S. at 42 (noting that "Congress dropped the phrase
`not specifically provided for by statute' in its 1948 consolidation").
327 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000)) (emphasis
added) (providing that federal courts "shall have power to issue all writs not specifically
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdic-
tions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"); see also judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 14,1 Stat. 73,81-82 (providing that federal courts "shall have power to issue writs of
scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specifically provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law").
328 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
322 See Syngenta, 295 U.S. at 32; Pa. Bureau of Corr, 474 U.S. at 43.
336 Price, 334 U.S. at 278-79.
"I Id.
332 Id. at 279.
333 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 451-452 (1940).
Indeed, the Price Court reasoned that the fact that the writ was "in the nature of a
writ of habeas corpus" meant that it '`clearly falls within the scope of [the All Writs Act]."
334 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).
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for which All Writs Act relief is sought.'" Rather, the All Writs Act is
precisely designed for circumstances where more specific statutes do
not provide for the necessary remedy.
To criticize the dicta in Syngenta and Pennsylvania Bureau is not to
say that those cases were wrongly decided. Syngenta was right to hold
that the All Writs Act does not authorize removal. 336 As the Supreme
Court recognized, "The right of removal is entirely a creature of stat-
ute."3" Removal bears no resemblance to any common law writ, and,
therefore, is not properly authorized by the All Writs Act. Likewise,
Pennsylvania Bureau was correct to hold that the district court could not
fashion an "ad-hoc writ" simply because other procedures were incon-
venient.338 A writ of error, on the other hand, is designed for the spe-
cific purpose of enabling a superior court to review a lower court deci-
sion. It is a writ that federal law recognized and that Congress explicitly
sought to preserve (albeit in a different procedural form) when it
conunanded in 1948 that all federal statutes be "construed as amended
to the extent necessary to substitute appeal for writ of error." 339
Indeed, to take the dicta in Syngenta and Pennsylvania Bureau lit-
erally would contradict the Supreme Court's ongoing endorsement of
appellate mandamus under the All Writs Act. 34° There are dozens of
statutes that "specifically address" a court's jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus."' None of these statutes, other than the All Writs Act it-
335 See Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32; Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43.
335 Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 31.
337 Id. at 32.
335 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43.
3" Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 23, 62 Stat. 869, 990.
S10 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 392 (2004); Mallard v. U.S Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1989).
341 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(c) (2000) (providing federal courts "jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus, or orders affording like relief, commanding any person to comply with
the provisions of this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order of the [Commodity Futures
Trading] Commission thereunder"); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2000) (providing federal courts "ju-
risdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person, partnership, or corpora-
tion to comply with the provisions of this subchapter or any order of the [Federal Trade]
Commission made in pursuance thereof"); 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (pro-
viding federal courts "jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person to
comply with the provisions of this subchapter or any order of the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission made in pursuance thereof"); 15 U.S.C. § 717s(b) (2000) (providing
federal courts "jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person to comply
with the provisions of this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order of the [Federal Power]
Commission thereunder"); 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000) ("Mandamus shall lie to remedy any
failure to issue a prompt ruling on such a motion (to modify or terminate an injunction
relating to prison conditions]."); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing that if
the district court denies a crime victim's request for statutorily provided rights, "the
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self, authorize the sort of appellate mandamus that is now a staple of
federal appellate jurisdiction. By endorsing the writ of mandamus as a
method of interlocutory appellate review, 342 the Court has implicitly
rejected any Syngenta-based critique of allowing interlocutory appeals
under the All Writs Act.
B. Reinventing Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Orders:
The Role of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
This Section addresses the narrow category of interlocutory orders
for which immediate appeals are currently available as a matter of
rights° These orders, again, are principally those that refuse to enforce
a governmental defendant's claim that he is immune from civil suits"
The Supreme Court has rationalized the right to an immediate appeal
of such orders under the collateral order doctrine. 345 As a policy matter,
allowing appeals as of right in such circumstances is not unreasonable.
movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus"); 19 U.S.C. § 1333(c)
(2000) (providing federal courts "jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding
compliance with" efforts by the International Trade Commission to compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of documents); 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(f) (7) (C) (2000) (pro-
viding federal courts "jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding compliance
with the provisions of this subsection or any order of the [Secretary of Commerce] or the
[International Trade] Commission made in pursuance thereof"); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 {2000)
(providing federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of man-
damus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff'); 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b) (4) (B) (2000) ("The State may
enforce a time limitation under this section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the
court of appeals."); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(5) (2000) (authorizing mandamus to enforce
federal statute pertaining to public water systems); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(f) (2000) (authorizing
mandamus to enforce federal statute protecting employees who provide information about
nuclear energy); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(f) (2000) (authorizing mandamus to enforce federal
statute protecting employees who provide information about air pollution); 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(p) (2000) (authorizing federal courts to enforce via mandamus orders of the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board); 47 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000) {providing federal courts
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus ordering compliance with federal communications
law); 47 U.S.C. § 406 (2000) (providing federal courts jurisdiction to issue writs of man-
damus ordering carriers to furnish communications facilities); 48 U.S.C. § 872 (2000)
(authorizing the district court of Puerto Rico to issue writs of mandamus "in all proper
cases"); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(c) (2000) (authorizing mandamus to enforce federal statute
protecting employees who provide information about aviation safety); 49 U.S.C.
§ 60129(c) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (authorizing mandamus to enforce federal statute
protecting employees who provide information about pipeline safety).
342 See supra notes 146-187 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme Court's use
of mandamus as a vehicle for the courts of appeals to review district court decisions).
343 See infra notes 344-373 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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If particular interlocutory orders warrant immediate appellate review in
all cases, it is sensible to identify those orders and remove any uncer-
tainty about the appellate court's jurisdiction. The challenge, however,
is to develop a coherent reading of the relevant statutes that would jus-
tify such appeals. This Section argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) is a supe-
rior source of appellate court jurisdiction over such appeals. 346 It also
responds to potential critiques of this approach. 347
1. The Availability and Advantages of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) as a Basis
for Interlocutory Appeals as of Right
The Supreme Court's special treatment of orders that deny a
government official's or government entity's claim of immunity is
based on a distinction between an "immunity from suit" and a mere
"defense to liability."348 An immunity constitutes a right not to stand
tria1. 349 In the parlance of the collateral order doctrine, this makes a
denial of immunity effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment because the defendant, in order to get to a final judgment,
must endure the trial-related burdens that the immunity is supposed
to prohibit.550 On the other hand, a mere defense to liability (e.g.,
that a lawsuit is barred by a previous settlement agreement between
the parties) is not a "right not to stand trial."351 Such a defense simply
entitles the defendant to prevail on the merits at the end of the day,
and that result can be accomplished by allowing the defendant to ap-
peal once a final judgment is reached.352
As explained above, this distinction between an immunity and a
defense does not flow from any plausible definition of the term "final
decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 353 A better fit would be § 1292(a),
which allows appeals of right from lilnterlocutory orders ... granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions." 354 What
makes immunities unique is not their "finaltityj "555 but rather their in-
junctive quality. As a matter of substantive law, an immunity creates not
346 See infra notes 348-360 and accompanying text.
347 See infra notes 361-373 and accompanying text.
345 E.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985). -
349 Id. at 527.
355 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
351 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,873 (1994).
352 See id. at 881.
353 See supra notes 112-129 and accompanying text.
354 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (2000).
555 Id. § 1291.
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merely a defense to liability but a right to halt the proceedings against
the immunity-holder. 336 It essentially entitles the defendant to enjoin the
action against her.
The Supreme Court's discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) in other
contexts supports this approach. It has recognized that § 1292(a) can
create appellate jurisdiction over orders that do not literally "'refuse'
an 'injunction" but that have "the practical effect of doing so." 337
Precisely because federal courts have interpreted this narrow category
of governmental immunities as creating a right to be free not only
from liability but also from trial-related burdens, a district court's de-
nial of such an immunity has the "practical effect" of refusing a de-
fendant's request for an injunction.
The principal benefit of this approach as compared to the collat-
eral order doctrine is textual coherence. Whatever the policy benefits
are for allowing immediate appeals from denials of governmental
immunities, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a plausible tex-
tual theory for why such orders are any more "final" than orders re-
jecting other defenses to liability.338 What the Court has made clear is
that, as a matter of substantive law, these governmental immunities
entitle the holder to what is, in essence, an injunction against having
to suffer the burdens of trial. 339 Accordingly, a theory of appellate ju-
risdiction that situates such appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) avoids
the interpretive gymnastics needed to label them "fmal decisions" for
purposes of § 1291. 36°
556 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
357 Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1)).
Admittedly, the Carson decision limited such appeals to interlocutory orders that 'might have
a 'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" and that "can be 'effectually challenged' only
by immediate appeal." Id. at 84 (quoting Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181
(1955)). But the Supreme Court has already determined that the narrow class of orders that
currently qualify under the collateral order doctrine would satisfy this standard. According to
the Supreme Court, a government official's right to be free from trial-related burdens "is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchtll, 472 U.S. at 526. It
follows .that such orders have irreparable consequences and are "effectively unreviewable"
absent an immediate appeal. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006).
• 359 See supra notes 111-137 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
369 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292.
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2. Responses to Potential Critiques of an Expanded Role for 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (a)
One possible critique of the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) solution is that it
is circular. The interlocutory rejection of a governmental immunity
qualifies as an immediately appealable "order ... refusing ... an in-
junction"361 because such an immunity entitles its holder to halt the
proceedings against her; the interlocutory rejection of some other de-
fense (e.g., res judicata) is not immediately appealable because it does
not entitle its holder to halt the proceedings against her. This logic is
circular, admittedly, in the sense that the language of § 1292(a) itself
does not dictate which orders are immediately appealable; rather, it
would be the fact that courts, as a matter of judicial policy, have deter-
mined that the order at issue involves a right that has an injunctive
quality.
But this critique applies with equal force to the approach courts
currently use. As explained above, the Supreme Court's treatment of
such orders ultimately boils down to a naked policy judgment that
such orders should be immediately appealable. 362 The difference—
and the reason why § 1292(a) is a better solution—is that this policy
judgment is currently obscured by the complex-yet-uninformative
strictures of the collateral order doctrine. 363 A jurisdictional theory
based on § 1292(a), on the other hand, makes this substantive policy
decision the central inquiry. By bringing the jurisdictional theory into
alignment with the policy judgments that actually determine whether
immediate appellate review is available, future courts faced with the
decision of whether to expand or contract the universe of immedi-
ately appealable orders will at least be asking (and answering) the
right question.364
One might also argue that the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) solution fails
to account for recent Supreme Court case law that potentially cuts
361 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1).
"2 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 111-131 and accompanying text.
584 Another possible critique is that the § 1292(a) solution proves too much. Imagine
that a party with a mere defense to liability (such as a res judicata defense based on a prior
judgment or settlement) asserted this defense as a "motion to enjoin the plaintiffs action. -
If the trial court denied that motion, there would indeed be an order "refusing" an injunc-
tion that would plainly be covered by § 1292(a). The answer to this hypothetical is that
such an appeal would be incredibly easy to decide because as a matter of.substantive law
the prior judgment or settlement—even if valid—does not entitle a defendant to an in-
junction. By contrast, an immunity (a "right not to stand trial") entitles the defendant to
stop the proceedings against her.
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back on the categorical availability of immediate appeals from orders
denying governmental immunity. In Johnson v. Jones, a civil rights case
decided by the Court in 1995, the plaintiff alleged that he had suf-
fered an unconstitutional beating at the hands of five police offi-
cers. 965 Three of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
basis that there was no evidence of their involvement in the beating. 566
The district court denied the motion because sufficient circumstantial
evidence existed to support the plaintiffs claims against these offi-
cers.367 The Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine did
not allow an immediate appeal of this order because it had "deter-
mine[d] only a question of 'evidence sufficiency.'" 368
As an initial matter, it is not clear that the Johnson decision in-
volved a trial court's denial of a governmental immunity as such. The
basis for the Johnson defendants' summary judgment motion was not
that a governmental immunity insulated them from liability, but
rather that they were not involved in the alleged beating at al1. 369 But
even if Johnson is read to preclude appeals as of right from immunity
denials based on the district court's assessment of evidentiary suffi-
ciency, such an "exception" is fully consistent with my proposed role
for 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). Indeed, the Supreme Court has long applied
precisely such an exception for injunction-related orders that are
clearly governed by § 1292(a). In Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Horne's
Market, Inc., the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction and moved
363 515  U.S. 304, 307 (1995).
366 Id. at 307-08.
367 Id, at 308.
368 Id. at 313.
369 Id. at 316 (describing Johnson as a "simple 'we didn't do it' case"). Indeed, the Court
in Johnson was careful not to describe the defendants' summary judgment motion itself as
being based on a governmental immunity, even though Johnson might generally be called a
"'qualified immunity' case" or one where government officials would be "entitled to assert
a qualified immunity defense." 515 U.S. at 307 (stating that although the defendants were
"entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, ... [t]he order in question resolved a fact-
related dispute about the pretrial record, namely, whether or not the evidence in the pre-
trial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial"). Only two years before
Johnson—in a case where a governmental immunity was clearly at issue—the Court rejected
an attempt to avoid an immediate appeal on the ground that the applicability of the im-
munity involved "factual questions." P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993) (allowing an immediate appeal of an order denying a motion to
dismiss a case on Eleventh Amendment grounds despite an argument that the availability
of Eleventh Amendment immunity in that case was "bound up with factual complexities"
and "present[ed] difficult factual questions"). But see Anderson, supra note 17, at 592-94
(stating the view that Johnson limited the availability of qualified immunity appeals" and
attempted to draw "a clear distinction between pure questions of law and questions of
fact").
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for summary judgment granting such an injunction.37° Reasoning that
genuine issues of material fact remained for trial, the district court
denied the motion."' Although such an order arguably "refuse [d] .. .
[an] injunction" within the meaning of § 1292(a), the Supreme Court
held that § 1292(a) did not allow immediate appeals of a district
court's determination that "unresolved issues of fact" surrounding the
propriety of an injunction required that "the case should go to
Warm Thus, the recognition of an exception from the general rule
that immunity denials are categorically appealable where such denials
are based on questions of evidentiary sufficiency actually bolsters my
argument that § 1292(a) is a solid statutory foundation for immunity
appeals. The Johnson exception essentially incorporates an identical
exception that has long existed for "pure" injunction orders whose
appealability is more explicitly governed by § 1292(a) . 879
C. Appellate Jurisdiction Reinvented: Revisiting the Crazy Quilt
This Section reflects on a few matters that would arise if appellate
jurisdiction were indeed reinvented as I propose in this Article. Because
I propose solely a judicial reinvention of judicially-created methods for
interlocutory appellate, review, statutes and court rules providing for
interlocutory appellate review would remain on the books. One con-
cern, then, is how my proposed reinvention would interact with such
provisions. What, for example, would be the role of the certification
procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),374 or the provision in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) 373 for discretionary appellate review
of class certification orders?
My proposal that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) is the proper basis for review
of categorically appealable interlocutory orders would not be problem-
atic in this regard. As explained above, the current approach treats
such orders as appealable under the collateral order doctrine, 376 a judi-
cially-created basis for appellate jurisdiction that I propose to eliminate
entirely. Because the collateral order doctrine lacks a sound basis in
370 385 U.S. 23,23 (1966).
"I Id. at 23-24.
372 Id. at 25 (explaining that such orders are not in our View 'interlocutory' within the
meaning of § 1292(a) (1)").
575 See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313; Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25.
575 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
375 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
378 See supra notes 348-352 and accompanying text.
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positive law,377 my proposal to situate such appeals on more solid tex-
tual footing would create no new problems. Essentially, I am suggesting
that we eliminate one cumbersome, statutorily-questionable square of
the "crazy quilt"78 and replace it with a more coherent one.
A somewhat thornier issue is the relationship between my proposal
for discretionary All Writs Act appeals and existing statutory and rule-
based sources of discretionary appellate review. The scope of discre-
tionary appellate review under the All Writs Act would be broader than
both § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f), and therefore could fully encompass
appeals that are currently brought under those provisions. Under my
proposal, therefore, neither § 1292(b) nor Rule 23(f) would be for-
mally necessary for obtaining interlocutory appellate review.
The arguable superfluousness of § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f) under
my proposal would not necessarily make them irrelevant, however.
Even under my approach, parties might still ask the district court to
certify interlocutory appeals under § 1292 (b), because if certification is
granted it would signal to the court of appeals that the district court
believes an immediate appeal is appropriate (even though the appel-
late court would still have discretion whether or not to hear the ap-
peal). If § 1292(b) certification is denied, parties would still be able to
seek discretionary appellate review via the All Writs Act. In this regard,
the role of §1292(b) under my proposal would not be all that different
from how it is currently used. Even today, certification by the district
court is no guarantee that the court of appeals will hear the case. 379
And the availability of appellate mandamus and the collateral order
doctrine means that a lack of § 1292(b) certification does not auto-
matically foreclose immediate appellate review. 888 Thus, under both my
proposal and the current framework, § 1292(b) is a device that is po-
tentially advantageous but not strictly necessary for obtaining interlocu-
tory appellate review. My proposal has an unquestionable advantage,
however, in terms of procedural simplicity.881 The procedures are fur-
377 See supra notes 112-129 and accompanying text.
573 See supra note 15 and accompanying text
379 See SUP/17 notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
399 See, e.g., Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barren), 452 F.3d 892, 895-98 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(allowing appeal of discovery order under the collateral order doctrine); In re Chimenti,
79 F.3d 534, 538-40 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing mandamus review of a refusal to grant a
motion to remand).
331 See supra notes 297-308 and accompanying text. Suppose, for example, that a dis-
trict court certifies an order for immediate appeal under § 1292(b). A party seeking to
maximize its chances under the current regime would file: (1) a permission to appeal un-
der Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5, which would ask the court of appeals to exer-
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ther simplified, of course, if parties opt to bypass § 1292(b) altogether,
knowing that under either the All Writs Act or § 1292(h), the court of
appeals retains complete discretion whether or not to hear the appeal.
Rule 23(0's provision for discretionary appeals of class certifica-
tion rulings might also retain some significance under my proposal.
While the general availability of discretionary appeals under the All
Writs Act would render Rule 23(0's specific authorization of discre-
tionary appeals unnecessary, Rule 23(f) might still be valuable evidence
that, according to the Supreme Court (which promulgated the Rule)
and Congress (which refrained from vetoing the Rule),382 appellate
review of class certification orders is particularly worthwhile. In any
event, the overlap creates no additional procedural complexity because
a party could invoke both Rule 23(f) and the All Writs Act as bases for
discretionary appellate review in a single document—a petition for
permission to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. 383
I should stress that this Afticle is certainly not the first to argue
that federal appellate courts should have discretion to review inter-
locutory trial court orders. 3" This Article adds significant new
strength to that argument, however. In the past, the' scholarly debate
has largely presumedithat such discretion would be inconsistent with
current statutes governing federal appellate court jurisdiction. 383
cise discretion to hear the § 1292(b) appeal, see FED. R. Are. P. 5(a)(1) ("To request per-
mission to appeal when an appeal is within the court of appeals' discretion, a party must
file a petition for permission to appeal."); see also, e.g., Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 552
F.2d 948,950 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting petitioner's use of Rule 5 to seek permission to appeal
under § 1292(b)); (2) a petition for a writ of mandamus, which could permit the court of
appeals to review the issue even if it determines that § 1292(b)'s prerequisites for immedi-
ate appeal were not satisfied, see, e.g., In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345,350-51 (6th Cir.
2002) (refusing to hear § 1292(b) appeal because the statutory factors were not present);
and (3) a notice of appeal, which could permit the court of appeals to review the issue
under a discretionary form of the collateral order doctrine. See supra notes 106-107 and
accompanying text (noting that a notice of appeal is the proper vehicle for invoking the
collateral order doctrine). Under my proposal, a party in this situation would file a single
petition for permission to appeal under Appellate Rule 5, which would seek to convince
the court of appeals to hear the case based on both its authority under § 1292(b) and its
authority under the All Writs Act.
582 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) (noting the Supreme Court's "power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure"); 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2000) (describing the
process by which the Supreme Court transmits such rules to Congress).
383 See Steinman, supra note 68, at 1234 & nn.305-06 (describing the consensus view
that Appellate Rule 5 is the method for pursuing Rule 23(f) appeals of class certification
orders).
t91 See supra note 36.
385 See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 7, at 788-89 (arguing that Congress should enact a
statute proposed by the American Bar Association that would allow discretionary appeals
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Others questioned "whether our institutions have matured" to the
point where broad discretionary review is appropriate. 386 This Article
reveals that neither of these concerns should delay a judicial reinven-
tion of appellate jurisdiction. First, this Article offers a new approach
that is consistent with what appellate courts are currently doing within
the cumbersome jurisdictional framework they have inherited.387 The
fact that the federal courts of appeals have already instituted a de
facto system of discretionary appellate review indicates that we are
indeed ready to discard the cumbersome framework within which
such review is now undertaken.388 Second, the framework proposed in
this Article fits with existing sources of appellate jurisdiction as well if
not better than the current approach. 389 It thus paves the way for a
reinvention of appellate jurisdiction that can occur in the same man-
ner that the bulk of the current framework came to be—not through
legislation or judicial rulemaking, but rather through good, old-
fashioned case law. Trading the collateral order doctrine and appel-
late mandamus for the doctrinal framework I propose would be a vast
improvement.
CONCLUSION
Few areas of civil procedure have received more critique and
scrutiny than the various doctrines governing appellate jurisdiction in
the federal system. The current regime has been criticized as much
for its doctrinal incoherence as for its procedural complexity. And it
has continued to vex the Supreme Court, which has failed to improve
the situation despite a consistent diet of cases raising issues of appel-
late jurisdiction. The current problems stem from the Court's attempt
in the mid-twentieth century to invent new sources of appellate juris-
diction. Although this expansion may have been necessary in light of
where one of three criteria is satisfied); Redish, supra note 36, at 126-27 (recognizing that
his proposed "pragmatic balancing approach" to appealability was in conflict with the pre-
vailing statutory scheme and arguing for the enactment of a statute "which allowed the
appellate court to authorize an appeal where, in the court's opinion, the dangers of deny-
ing justice by delay outweighed the harm of piecemeal appeal").
"6 Cooper, supra note 8, at 158; see also id. at 164 (questioning whether "our institu-
tions are ready for a more openly discretionary system of interlocutory appeal").
"7 See supra notes 246-272 and accompanying text.
666 Cf. Cooper, supra note 8, at 157 (arguing in 1984 that Itihe best answer may be to
adopt the framework for discretionary interlocutory appeals without yet abolishing the
present rules. As the discretionary system becomes more familiar, it should prove possible
to discard many of the present rules").
3a} See supra notes 290-293, 354-360 and accompanying text.
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the increasing importance of interlocutory rulings in modern litiga-
tion, the doctrinal methods by which the Court accomplished that
expansion were misguided. A reinvention of appellate jurisdiction is
now very much in order.
The solution proposed in this Article would bring the doctrinal
framework into alignment with the actual practice of appellate courts.
It would retain the authority of the federal courts of appeals to en-
gage in discretionary review of interlocutory orders in those rare cir-
cumstances where such review is deemed appropriate. And it would
retain the appellate courts' obligation to hear interlocutory appeals
for that very small category of orders that are immediately appealable
as of right. But unlike the current approach, this proposed reinven-
tion would situate all interlocutory appeals on a more solid textual
and doctrinal footing, while optimizing the procedural mechanisms
for invoking appellate jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX
tile 1: Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Cases Since 1980
I	 o. Case Citation Interlocutory Order at Issue
1. Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007) Order refusing to immunize a federal employee
under the Westfall Act.
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) Order refusing to dismiss a case based on the
judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
4 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367
(2004)
Order allowing discovery against the Vice
President.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003)
Order requiring criminal defendant to
involuntarily receive medication to render him
competent to stand trial.
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527
U.S. 198 (1999)
Order imposing sanctions on an attorney for
discovery violations.
Clinton v. [ones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) Order refusing to stay discovery.
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299
(1996)
Order refusing to grant summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706 (1996)
Order remanding a case on the basis of Burford
abstention.
Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996)
Order granting a defendant partial summary
'udgment on the ground that remedies
Provided by federal maritime law were exclusive.
10. United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54
(1996)
Order enforcing a summons by the Internal
Revenue Service.
11. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) Order refusing to grant summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.
2. Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n,
514 U.S. 35 (1995)
Order refusing to grant summary judgment
based on municipality's Monett defense.
13. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct,
Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994)
Order refusing to dismiss a case based on a
settlement agreement._prior
14. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993)	 ,Eleventh
Order denying a claim of immunity under the
Amendment,
5. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249 (1992)
Order denying motion to strike a jury trial
demand.
16. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617
(1990)
Order remanding case to agency for
reconsideration.
17. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S.
495 (1989)
Order denying motion to dismiss based on a
contractual forum-selection clause.
18. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794 (1989)
Order denying motion to dismiss a grand jury
indictment.
19. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S.
296 (1989)
Order requiring an attorney to represent
indigent inmates in a § 1983 lawsuit against
prison officials.
0 . Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S.
517 (1988)
Order denying forum non conveniens motion.
1 . Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988)
Order denying motion to stay or dismiss action.
P	 . Kamen v. Nordberg , 485 U.S. 939 (1988) Order denying a jury trial.
' 3. Budinich v. Becton Dickson & Co., 486
U.S. 196 (1988)	 .
Final judgment on the merits where request for
attorneys fees had not yet been decided.
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Table it Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Cases Since 1980
No. Case Citation Interlocutory Order at Issue
24. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987)
Order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right.
25. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987)
Order dismissing one claim in a complaint.
26. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) Order denying claim of qualified immunity.
27. Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424 (1985)
Order disqualifying counsel.
28. Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S.
1067 (1985)
Order dismissing one count in a complaint.
29. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985)
Order refusing to dismiss a case on claim
preclusion grounds.
30. Claiborne v. United States, 465 U.S.
1305 (1984)
Order denying claim of judicial immunity.
31. Richardson v. United States, 968 U.S.
317 (1984)
Order denying motion to bar a retrial on
Double Jeopardy grounds.
32. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
(1984)
Order disqualifying counsel.
33. Rohrer Hibler & Replogle v. Perkins,
469 U.S. 890 (1984)
Order remanding a case to state court based on
a forum selection clause.
34. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
Order staying federal court action pursuant to
Pullman absten don doctrin e.
35. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982)
Order denying claim of absolute presidential
immunity.
36. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982)
Order denying claim of absolute immunity for
presidential aides.
37. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car
Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982)
Order denying motion to dismiss based on
vindictive prosecution.
38. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
449 U.S. 368 (1981)
Order denying motion to disqualify counsel.
39. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, AFL-
CIO v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949 (1981)
Order remanding case to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
40. Carson v. Am: Brands, Inc., 950 U.S. 79
(1981)
Order denying motion to enter a consent
decree.
41. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
472 (1980)
Order allowing class counsel fees to be paid
from class action judgment.
42. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449
U.S. 33 (1980)
Order granting defendants' motion for a new
trial.
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Table 2: Early Circuit Court of Appeals Mandamus Cases (1891-1901) *
No. Case Citation
1. Macfarland v. United States ex reL Miller, 18 App. D.C. 554 (D.C. Cir. 1901)
2. Washington County v. Williams, 111 F. 801(8th Cir. 1901)
3. City of Cleveland v. United States, 111 F. 391 (6th Cir. 1901)
4. Graham v. Swayne, 109 F. 366 (5th Cir. 1901)
5. White v. Bruce, 109 F. 355 (5th Cir. 1901)
6. United States ex td. Paine v. Philips, 109 F. 1063 (8th Cir. 1901)
7. United States cx rel. Brown v. Root, 18 App. D.C. 239 (D.C. Cir. 1901)
8. fames v. Cent. Trust Co. of N.Y., 108 F. 929 (4th Cir. 1901)
9. Nichols v. McGhee, 108 F. 989 (5th Cir. 1901)
10. United States ex reL Bride v. MacFarland, 18 App. D.C. 120 (D.C. Cir. 1901)
11. Rowan v. Ide, 107 F. 161 (5th Cir. 1901)
12. United States ex rel. Stapleton v. Duell, 17 App. D.C. 575 (D.C. Cir. 1901)
13. United States ex rel. Bronson Co. v. Duell, 17 App. D.C. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1901)
14. United States v. Hammond, 104 F. 862 (6th Cir. 1900)
15. Kimberlin v. Comm'n to Five Civilized Tribes, 104 F. 653 (8th Cir. 1900)
16. The New York, 104 F. 561 (6th Cir. 1900)
17. City of Helena v. United States, 104 F. 113 (9th Cir. 1900)
18. City of Little Rock V. United States, 103 F. 418 (8th Cir. 1900)
19. Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 F. 665 (8th Cir. 1900)
20. New England R.R. Co. v. Hyde, 101 F. 397 (1st Cir. 1900)
21. United States ex rel. Mut. Dist. Messenger Co. v. Wight, 15 App. D.C. 463 (D.C. Cir. 1899)
22. Ex parte Breese, 97 F. 980 (4th Cir. 1899)
23. C. & A. Potts & Co. v. Creager, 97 F. 78 (6th CU. 1899)
24. United States ex rel. Hufty v. Trimble, 14 App. D.C. 414 (D.C. Cir. 1899)
25. United States ex rel. Beal v. Cox, 14 App. D.C. 368 (D.C. Cir. 1899)
26. Ex Parte Franklin Mining Co., 90 F. 830 (6th Cir. 1899)
27. Church v. United States ex rel. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 13 App. D.C. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1898)
28. United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Duell, 13 App. D.C. 379 iD.C. Cir. 1898)
29. In re Put-In-Bay Waterworks, Light & Ry. Co, 90 F. 831 (6th Cir. 1898)
30. Roberts v. United States ex rel. Valentine, 13 App. D.C. 38 (D.C. Cir. 1898)
31. Scaife v. W. N.C. Land Co., 87 F. 308 (4th Cir. 1898)
32. United States ex rel. Washington v. fohnson, 12 App. D.C. 545 (D.C. CU. 1898)
33. United States cx rel. Wedderburn v. Bliss, 12 App. D.C. 485 (D.C. Cir. 1898)
34. Deuel County v. First Nat'l Bank of Buchanan County, 86 F. 264 (8th Cir. 1898)
35. United States v. Indian Grave Drainage Dist., 85 F. 928 (7th CU. 1898)
36. Fleming v. Trowsdaie, 85 F. 189 (6th Cir. 1898)
37. United States v. fudges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 85 F. 177 (8th Cir. 1898)
38. United States ex rel. Sheehy v. lohnson, 12 App. D.C. 92 (D.C. CU. 1898)
39. Ex parte Mansfield, 11 App. D.C. 558 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
40. United States ex rel. De Yturbide v. Metro. Club of Wash., 11 App. D.C. 180 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
41. Wagner v. Morris, 82 F. 1006 (4th Cir. 1897)
42. United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Seymour, 11 App. D.C. 91 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
43. Seymour v. Nelson, 11 App. D.C. 58 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
44. Holt County v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 80 F. 686 (8th Cir. 1897)
45. Seymour v. United States ex rel. Brodie, 10 App. D.C. 567 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
46. United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Seymour, 10 App. D.C. 294 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
47. United States ex rel. Brightwood Ry. Co. v. O'Neal, 10 App. D.C. 205 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
48. Ex parte Hun tt, 10 App. D.C. 275 (D.C. Cir. 1897)
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ble 2: Early Circuit Court of Appeals Mandamus Cases (1891-1901)'"
No. Case Citation
9. Brazoria County v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 80 F. 10 (5th Cir. 1897)
0. Town of Darlington v. Atl. Trust Co., 78 F. 596 (4th Cir. 1897)
1. Ex parte Citizens' Nat'l Bank, of Des Moines, Iowa, 79 F. 991 (8th Cir. 1896)
2. Ex parte Nat'l Masonic Acc. Ass'n, of Des Moines, Iowa, 79 F. 999 (8th Cir. 1896)
3. Stryker v. Bd. of Conun'rs, 77 F. 567 (8th Cir. 1896)
4. Lant v. Manley, 75 F. 627 (6th Cir. 1896)
5. Fuller v. Aylesworth, 75 F. 694 (6th Cir. 1896)
6. Ex parte Stirling Co., 76 F. 1006 (6th Cir. 1896)
7. In re Woerishoffer, 75 F. 335 (5th Cir. 1896)
8. In re Ricks, 79 F. 1001 (5th Cir. 1896)
9. United States ex rel. Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co. v. Severens, 76 F. 1006 (fith Cir. 1896)
• I Ross v. United States ex rel. Prospect Hill Cemetery, 8 App. D.C. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1896)
•1. N. Ala. Dev. Co. v. Orman, 71 F. 764 (5th Cir. 1896)
.2 . Carlisle v. United States cc rel. Waters, 7 App. D.C. 517 (D.C. Cir. 1896)
3 . Ross v. United States ex rel. Goodfellow, 7 App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
Lochren v. United States ex rel. Long, 6 App. D.C. 486 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
•5. Brown v. Bradley, 6 App. D.C. 207 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
• • Bd. of Conun'rs v. King, 67 F. 945 (8th Cir. 1895)
•7. Bd. of Comm'rs v. King, 67 F. 202 (8th Cir. 1895)
.8. Moore v. Miller, 5 App. D.C. 413 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
.9. United States v. Swan, 65 F. 647 (6th Cir. 1895)
0. Leonard v. Rodda, 5 App. D.C. 256 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
1. United States ex rel. Kerr. Ross, 5 App. D.C. 241 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
2. United States ex rel. Miles Planting & Mfg. Co. v. Carlisle, 5 App. D.C. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1895)
3. Lewis v. Balt. & Lehigh R.R. Co., 62 F. 218 (4th Cir. 1894)
4. Ex parte Redmond, 3 App. D.C. 317 (D.C. Cir. 1894)
5. Bd. of Supervisors v. Thompson, 61 F. 914 (fith Cir. 1894)
6. Breckinridge County v. McCracken, 61 F. 191 (6th Cir. 1894)
7. United States ex rel. Int'l Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 2 App. D.C. 532 (D.C. Cir. 1894)
8. Seymour v. United States (Iv rd. South Carolina, 2 App. D.C. 240 (D.C. Cir. 1894)
9. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 59 F. 813 (8th Cir. 1894)
G. United States v. Bd. of Liquidation of City Debt, 60 F. 387 (5th Cir. 1894)
:1. Police jury, v. United States (5th Cir. 1894)
:2. Ashley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 60 F. 55 (6th Cir. 1893)
:3. Starcke v. Klein, 62 F. 502 (5th Cir. 1893)
Wineman v. Gastrell, 53 F. 697 (5th Cir. 1892)
:5. Blanks v. Klein, 53 F. 436 (5th Cir. 1892)
:6. Dempsey v. Twp. of Oswego, 51 F. 97 (8th Cir. 1892)
:7. Del. & Ad. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delaware ex rd. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 50 F. 677 (3d Cir. 1892)
8. In re Coe, 49 F. 481 (1st Cir. 1892)
9. United States v. Town of Cicero, 50 F. 147 (7th Cir. 1892)
0. The Lurline, 57 F. 398 (2d Cir. 1892)
1. Blanks v. Klein, 49 F. 1 (5th Cir. 1891) .
These cases were obtained by searching the "CTA-OLD" database on Westlaw for all cases
etween 1891 and 1901 that contain the word "mandamus" in the synopsis.
